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ABSTRACT
In this thesis we propose a skeptical scenario about a priori knowledge. The scenario is
composed of three main arguments: the a priori brain-in-a-vat argument, the problem of
deduction, and the rule–following paradox. We propose a solution for a priori skepticism
that is based on two philosophical schools: conventionalism and contextualism. Finally, we
provide a sufficient condition – although hard to satisfy – for relieving a priori skepticism.
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Introduction

The idea that humans can acquire and possess knowledge inde-

pendently of experience was rooted in philosophical thought since
the times of the Ancient Greeks. In fact, two major philosophical
schools emerged, in which the relationship between knowledge and
experience was problematized and became the subject of conicting
epistemological outlooks. The rationalist school claimed that a portion of human knowledge can only be justied independently from
experience (viz.

a priori knowledge), while the empiricist school

generally denied this possibility, and claimed that all knowledge can
only originate in and be justied with reference to sensuous experience (viz. a posteriori knowledge). A third approach to knowledge
is skepticism which comes in many forms 1 . One form is the epis-

temological form (i.e. focuses on the epistemic status of a certain
proposition).

Another is the ontological form (i.e.

focuses on the

state of existence of a specic entity like the `universal'). Also, skepticism can vary in degree; it can be local or radical. Local skepticism
is concerned with limited beliefs about specic subjects, like beliefs
about mathematical objects. On the other hand, radical skepticism
challenges all beliefs formed about all subject matters. Historically,
radical epistemological skepticism can be traced back to two sources:

Pyrrhonian skepticism and Cartesian skepticism. The former type
counterargues any belief through some skeptical strategies that are
at least as compelling as the original argument(s) oered. The latter
type mainly uses the skeptical hypotheses strategy to undermine the
supposed knowledge claims. In the Cartesian method, the skeptic
will start by suggesting that the claimed knowledge might possi-

bly be wrong, and that the skeptical hypothesis might possibly be
true. But since we don't know whether the skeptical hypothesis is
right or wrong, it follows that we also lack knowledge of the original proposition in question. A variety of skeptical hypotheses have
been proposed. In Descartes's Meditations on First Philosophy, the

rst Meditation oered three skeptical arguments: (i) the sense illusion argument, (ii) the dream argument, and (iii) the `Evil Genius'
argument. The Evil Genius argument  which is the most radical
one  might be sketched as follows: imagine that you live in a world
where an Evil Genius is deceiving you about all subject matters. Ac1 Our

discussion of skepticism relies on Pritchard (2016).

1

cordingly, all your beliefs about the world are systematically false 2 .
With the rise of philosophical materialism in the 20th century, some
philosophers claimed that the Cartesian Evil Genius hypothesis is

logically impossible as it is not possible for a matterless mind to exist3 . Therefore, Hilary Putnam (1981) proposed a new version of the
Cartesian skeptical hypothesis that is consistent with materialism:
the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis 4 . Imagine that you are a disembodied
brain oating in a vat, and connected to a massive computer that
can produce a simulation indiscernible from external reality. Now,
your experience of the external world will be identical with the experience of an ordinary person who is not a brain-in-a-vat (BIV 5 ).
Thus, the skeptical hypothesis claims our inability to show that our

basic beliefs about the external world are de facto true. Denote any

P , and denote the skeptical
Sh ; then the skeptical argument will take the following

external world propositional claim by
hypothesis by
form6 :




a1 .
a2 .

I am unable to know the denials of

If I am unable to know the denials of

know that



Sh

c.

Sh .

P

Sh ,

then I do not

is true.

Thus, I do not know that

P

is true.

is any hypothesis that is irreconcilable with commonly claimed

propositional knowledge. The strength of

Sh is that it imposes a sce-

nario that is subjectively indistinguishable from `normal' situations.
The skeptical premise in (a) claims that it is not possible to refute

Sh ,

and that it holds, at least in terms of logical possibility. But if

(a) is correct, then any proposition
the falsehood of
in (c) that

P

Sh

P

the truth of which depends on

is threatened too. Hence, the skeptic concludes

is unknowable.

Most commonly, skeptical arguments have been applied to a pos-

teriori propositions (e.g. the existence of the external world) since
2 See Greco (2007) for an exposition of external world skepticism.
3 See Brueckner (2016).
4 Putnam's original formulation used the plural term brains-in-a-vat,

however most of the

recent literature on external world skepticism refers to the singular brain-in-a-vat (maybe
to stick to the Cartesian formulation).

5 Putnam essentially used semantic externalism to argue against the brain-in-a-vat scenario.
6 This formulation is due to Pritchard (2016)
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they are falsiable by nature, at least in principle. In this essay, however, we are interested in another underexplored type of skepticism,
namely skepticism concerning the truth of a priori propositions. We
call this latter type of skepticism a priori skepticism .

Our inter-

est in a priori skepticism stems from three dierent problems that
are already available in philosophical literature. These problems, if
combined, provide well-founded grounds for being skeptic about a
priori knowledge. Generally speaking, we distinguish between two
types of a priori skepticism: (i) the a priori brain-in-a-vat argument,
and (ii) the problem of formal language skepticism.
The a priori brain-in-a-vat argument is obtained by twisting the
external world brain-in-a-vat argument to target a priori instead of
a posteriori knowledge 7 . On the other hand, the problem of formal
language skepticism targets a specic type of a priori knowledge,
namely our formal logical-mathematical knowledge.

The problem

of formal language skepticism is twofold: (a) the problem of deduction, and (b) the rule-following paradox. The former can be found
in Susan Haack's (1976) critique of the justication of deductive systems. What she aims at is constructing an analogous formulation
of the problem of induction for deductive inferential systems. But if
we are entitled to doubt the validity of deductive arguments, then
we are certainly also entitled to be skeptic about a priori knowledge.

Dierently, the rule-following paradox originated from Saul

Kripke's (1982) interpretation of Wittgenstein's Philosophical In-

vestigations . Kripke's rule-following paradox can be summarized as
follows: any rule can be restated in a way that makes any action

conform to it. If Kripke is correct then (almost) anything can be
inferred from any rule  including logical and mathematical rules 
which feeds our skepticism about a priori knowledge. Another vital
aspect in the discussion of a priori skepticism revolves around who
has the burden of proof ?

Michael Rescorla (2009) describes two

general philosophical positions regarding this question.

Dialectical

foundationalism asserts that our reasoning is contingent on certain
privileged propositions, and therefore we are not supposed to defend them just because they are challenged by an interlocutor. On
the contrary, Dialectical egalitarianism argues against the claimed
special status of these propositions, and that all propositions can be
7A

priori skepticism can be found in Beebe (2011) and Willenken (2015).
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philosophically challenged. In this essay, we are going to escape this
debate by endorsing Dialectical egalitarianism.
At face value, it seems very dicult to be skeptic about a priori
knowledge, as we have the intuition that this represents a kind of
knowledge of something that holds necessarily, i.e cannot be otherwise. Upon further reection, Kripke argued that this need not be
the case8 . Thus by releasing a priority from its supposedly essential relation to necessity, the task of doubting the a priori becomes
easier.

But, then, what is the source of the apparent necessity of

a priori knowledge?

We will argue for two main sources: conven-

tionalism and contextualism. The rest of our thesis will mainly defend a contextualistic and a conventionalistic view of a priori knowledge, a view we label contextual-conventionalism . With the help of
contextual-conventionalism, we will be able to track the origin of
a priori skepticism to one fundamental source, namely the lack of

external conventions. We conclude that if we want to refute a priori
skepticism, we rst need to resolve the problem of the absence of
external conventions.
Our thesis is organized as follows:

in sections 2-4 we will lay

down the  aforementioned  three philosophical problems (viz. the
a priori brain-in-a-vat argument, the problem of deduction, and the
rule-following paradox). In section 5, we will explore the relation between a priority and modality. Necessity will be studied by relying
on Kripke's notion of rigid designators . At the end of this investigation, it is found that rigid designators are problematic unless tied
to specic contexts. By associating rigidity with specic contexts,
we will end up with a restricted notion of rigidity, namely contextual

rigidity . In section 6, we will move to the rst pillar of our thesis
by elaborating on the conventionalist tradition in philosophy from
Henri Poincaré to David Lewis. We mainly defend a specic version
of conventionalism that combines the views of Rudolf Carnap and
David Lewis against the attacks of W.V. Quine. Then, in section
7, we will present the second pillar of our thesis, namely contextualism. In the last section, we will present two possible solutions for
a priori skepticism.
8 Kripke's

The rst solution will be based on a reading

ideas will be discussed in detail in section 5.
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of Wittgenstein's hinge propositions which has been used by some
philosophers to counter external world skepticism 9 . Next, we show
that hinge propositions might work as an anti-skeptical strategy
for the a priori brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, but not for the problem
of formal language skepticism. Instead, we propose a new method
which combines both conventionalism and contextualism, namely
contextual-conventionalism 10 to deal with the a priori brain-in-a-vat
hypothesis and the problem of formal language skepticism. Finally,
we provide a sucient condition  call it absence of external conventions  under which contextual-conventionalism can be the remedy
for a priori skepticism.

2

Formal Language Skepticism I: The Circularity Problem

2.1

Alston's Notion of Epistemic Circularity

Circular justication has always been problematic for many philosophers across history 11 . Despite being defended by a contemporary
group of epistemologists including Laurence BonJour (1985) and
Keith Lehrer (1974, 1990), there is still a wide resistance to this
philosophical position 12 . In this section we are interested in a special
type of circular justication, namely epistemic circularity . Generally speaking, an argument is epistemically circular if it argues for
the reliability of a belief source by using premises or methods that
rely on the same belief source in question. We owe the contemporary notion of epistemic circularity to William Alston (1986, 1989)
who basically claims that there is no plausible way of having a justied belief about our basic sources of knowledge (e.g. perception,
intuitive reasoning, introspection, memory, etc.) without using an
epistemically circular method.

The problem of such conclusion is

that it allows for an `anything-goes' argument since we can infer
any proposition

P

by relying on a belief source that uses

9 C.f. Crispin Wright (1985) and Peter Strawson
10 There is another vein of semantic responses to

(1985).

a general overview, see Eemeren et al (1996).
Murphy (2016)
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itself.

skepticism due to Donald Davidson. See

for instance Davidson (1986), and Brueckner (1992).

11 For
12 See

P

Alston (1986) starts his investigation by posing a question (originally asked by Thomas Reid (1863)):
For Thomas Reid the most basic epistemological issue was
whether we are proceeding rationally in trusting, as we do,
our basic sources of belief perception, introspection, memory, testimony, and reasoning.

Less metaphorical terms

than `source of belief ' would be dispositions, tendencies,
or habit to form beliefs of certain kinds in certain circumstances. (1)
Alston is mainly interested in asking Reid's question regarding per-

ceptual beliefs . In other words, Alston asks whether we are rationally
justied in relying on perceptual experiences of the immediate physical environment to form perceptual beliefs. He uses what he calls
an inductive Track Record Argument (TRA) to check the validity
of this question. This TRA goes as follows:
1.

Perceptual experiences indicate

2.

β1 ,

3.

... ,

βn

β1 ,

... ,

β1 ,

...

βn .

are true.

Perceptual experiences indicate

,

βn ,

and

β1 ,

...

,

βn

are true.
4.

Hence, perceptual experiences generate accurate truth regarding

5.

β1 ,

... ,

βn .

Therefore, perceptual beliefs formed by perceptual experiences
are reliable.

The problem of the TRA appears when moving from (1) to (2).
To justify that ` β1 , . . .

,

βn

is true,' the TRA implicitly assumes

that perceptual experience is reliable based on previous observations
which is supposed to be the conclusion. This is what Alston labels

epistemic circularity . In his words: this kind of circularity involves
a commitment to the conclusion as a presupposition of our supposing
ourselves to be justied in holding the premises. 13 
Lynch and Silva (2016) provide a restricted version of epistemic
circularity:
13 (1993,

14)

6

Denition 1.

(Epistemic Circularity) An argument

A

for the relia-

bility of a belief source is epistemically circular for a thinker
in case (i)

A's

conclusion that

belief in at least one of
and (iii)
had

S

A's

X

S

just

S 's
S employing X ,

is a reliable belief source, (ii)

premises is a result of

S 's

belief in these premises would not have been justied
not employed X 14 .

In addition to epistemic circularity, Alston (1989, 1993) is committed to a generic form of reliabilism which states:

Denition 2.
P

(Alston's Reliabilism): subject

if and only if

P

S

is justied to believe

has a suciently reliable causal source.

Hence if sense perception, along with induction, is reliable, then
we are justied in accepting the premises of the TRA, and hence
the conclusion is obtained by an inductive procedure. Nevertheless,
Alston still acknowledges a problem in justifying the premises of the
TRA. He writes:
Epistemic circularity does not in and of itself disqualify
the argument. But even granting this point, the argument
will not do its job unless we are justied in accepting its
premises; and that is the case only if sense perception is
in fact reliable. This is to oer a stone instead of bread.
We can say the same of any belief-forming practice whatever, no matter how disreputable.

We can just as well

say of crystal ball gazing that if it is reliable, we can use
a track-record argument to show that it is reliable. But
when we ask whether one or another source of belief is reliable, we are interested in discriminating those that can be
reasonably trusted from those that cannot. Hence merely
showing that if a given source is reliable it can be shown
by its record to be reliable, does nothing to indicate that
the source belongs to the sheep rather than with the goats.
(1993, 17)
In the rst line of the quotation given above, Alston writes that
epistemic circularity does not in and of itself disqualify the argument.

What he probably means is that if we can grant that reli-

abilism, sense perception and induction hold, then we are justied
14 4.
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to accept the conclusion of the TRA. This epistemic demonstration
is problematic since it does not discriminate between reasonably
trusted sources and other non-reasonably trusted sources (e.g. between sense perceptions and crystal ball-gazing). Lynch and Silva
(2016) illustrate why epistemic demonstration is not enough  since
it clashes with other epistemic principles  by the following ctional
scenario:
Susan and Sally form beliefs about their immediate physical environment in surprisingly dierent ways.

Susan

forms perceptual beliefs like we do: she takes her perceptual experiences as of

P

and proceeds to believe

P

vided she has no relevant undefeated defeaters).

(proSally,

by contrast, forms perceptual beliefs quite dierently: she
takes her perceptual experiences as of

P

and (provided

she has no relevant undefeated defeaters) she proceeds to
believe (not-P &M P ) where

MP

is the proposition that

I'm in the Matrix and I'm having an experience as of

P.

However, she always acts as if

P,

and thus is able to

live quite successfully despite her many false perceptual
beliefs.

One day Susan and Sally encounter each other,

and, looking out upon a beautiful lake, Susan comments,
`That's a beautiful lake,' Sally replies, `There is no lake.
But our misleading experience as of a lake is beautiful.'
Susan and Sally continue to share their beliefs about their
immediate environment, and both come to realize that
they have extensively inconsistent views and that this difference is owed to their very dierent ways of responding
to their perceptual experiences. It is immediately obvious
to Susan and Sally that their ways of arriving at perceptual beliefs cannot both be reliable, i.e., at least one of
their ways of arriving at perceptual beliefs is unreliable.
(12-13)
The moral of the ctional story is to show how epistemic disagreement can be dependent on the fundamental methods employed by
dierent people to form their beliefs. Lynch and Silva (2015) label
this disagreement as deep epistemic disagreement and the situation
as deep epistemic disagreement situation . More precisely, they dene the former as follows:

8

Denition 3. S1
in case:

(i)

S1

is in a deep epistemic disagreement with
employs an epistemic principle,

true beliefs in some domain of inquiry, (ii)

S2

EP ,

S2

just

to arrive at

rejects that epistemic

principle as a reliable guide to forming true beliefs in that domain,
∗
and (iii) S1 has no further epistemic principle, EP , that does not
rely on or presuppose the reliability of
that

EP

EP

with which he can show

is in fact a reliable mean of arriving at true beliefs 15 .

The problem of the deep epistemic disagreement is that it is asym-

metric in the sense that subjects disagree on the reliability of their
epistemic principles. Moreover, there is no plausible way, from the
subjects' view-point, to weigh a specic epistemic principle over another.
So far, we have been discussing the problem of epistemic circularity with reference to perceptual beliefs, however, in this thesis we
are interested in exploring whether a similar problem can arise regarding a priori knowledge and a priori justication . Therefore, in
the next section we are going examine a dierent form of epistemic
circularity that is related to the deductive process of justication.
2.2

The Problem of Deduction

The problem of induction has been much debated in modern philosophy since David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature ; however, its
analogous counterpart  the problem of deduction  did not attract
much attention until Lewis Carroll wrote a famous paper in 1895
describing the problem. In this paper, Carroll narrated a discussion
in which Achilles is trying to convince the tortoise to accept the
Euclidean argument:



P1 :

Things that are equal to the same are equal to each other.



P2 :

The two sides of this Triangle are things that are equal to

the same.



C:

The two sides of this Triangle are equal to each other.

Surprisingly, the tortoise wonders: what if a person accepts

P2 ,
P2 ,

but rejects

C

?

Achilles responds that if one accepts

then he must accept

note  that if one accepts

C.
P1

P1
P1

and
and

The tortoise suggests adding Achilles'
and

P2 , then he must accept C

15 13.
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 as an

extra premise to the argument, and calls it

P3 .

Despite that, and

unexpectedly, the tortoise asks about the possibility of accepting

P1 , P2

and

P3 ,

but still denying

C.

Achilles tries to strengthen

the Euclidean argument by adding an extra premise
that `if

P1 , P2 ,

and

P3

are true, then

C

P4

expressing

must be true.' After some

time, Achilles realizes that this process can continue ad innitum
without forcing the tortoise to accept the conclusion

C.

The tortoise

summarizes its general position by arguing that Whatever Logic is
good enough to tell me is worth writing down 16 . In that way, the
exact method of reasoning should always be stated explicitly in the
form of extra premises which implies that a conclusion can never be
forced. Haack (1976) notices that Achilles' failure in convincing the
tortoise is analogous to the failure of adding the extra premise of the
uniformity of nature to justify induction. One way to solve this, for
Haack, is to propose a set of rules that can justify the conclusion
from premises

P1 and P2 in the aforementioned argument.

C

Therefore,

she suggests dening an argument by the following:

Denition 4.

For

sentences where

n ≥ 1, an argument is a sequence P1 , P2 , ..., Pn , C of
P1 , P2 , ..., Pn are premises and C is the conclusion.

Then, she proposes a syntactic denition for a valid deductive argument,

Denition 5.
system

S

P1 , P2 , ..., Pn ⊢ C is deductively valid in a
C follows from the premises P1 , P2 , ..., Pn ,
virtue of the rules of inference of S .

An argument

if the conclusion

and the axioms of

S,

by

Hence, we can justify a modus ponens argument, for instance, because of a set of predetermined rules of inference in

S.

Clearly, these

rules of inference must be deductively valid too; otherwise, we cannot rely on them. The dilemma, again, is that we fall in circularity
because we are justifying deduction using a deductive method. So
Haack proposes another semantic denition for a deductively valid
argument:

Denition 6.

it impossible for the
conclusion

C

P1 , P2 , ..., Pn |= C is deductively
premises P1 , P2 , ..., Pn to be true and

An argument

valid if
for the

to be false.

The semantic denition proposes that the premises entail the conclusion. If this is the case, then any deductive argument need not
16 280.
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be justied as it will be true by virtue of meaning , i.e. the meaning of the set of premises
conclusion

C.

{P1 , P2 , ..., Pn },

and the meaning of the

In addition, the semantic denition cannot rely on

the schema (form) of the argument, rather it has to rely on some

instances of the argument. Due to the ambiguity of the notion of
meaning and the non-schematic form of the semantic denition,
Hack argues against it:
The claim that one can just see that the premisses justify
the conclusion is implausible in the extreme in view of the
fact that people can and do disagree about which arguments are valid.

Second, there is an implicit generality

in the claim that a particular argument is valid.

For to

say that an argument is valid is not just to say that its
premisses and its conclusion are true  for that is neither
necessary nor sucient for (semantic) validity. Rather, it
is to say that its premisses could not be true without its
conclusion being true also, i.e. that there is no argument of

that form with true premisses and false conclusion . But
if the claim that a particular argument is valid is to be
spelled out by appeal to other arguments of that form,
it is hopeless to try to justify that form of argument by
appeal to the validity of its instance. (118)
Hence, from Haack's perspective, there is no clear way of assigning

{P1 , P2 , ..., Pn }, |=, and C in a way that guarantees
impossible for P1 , P2 , ..., Pn to be true and for C to be

the semantics of
that it is
false17 .

To wrap up, Carroll's method in forcing a deductive conclusion
suers from premise-circularity , while Haack shows that a deductive justication of deduction suers from rule-circularity 18 . These
results can be considered as an extension of the notion of epistemic
17 In section 6,

we will argue for a conventional defense of the semantic denition of deductive

validity.

18 Rule-circularity

is not necessarily a problem if one is willing to accept that deduction is

not epistemologically rmer than induction. Hack writes:
Those of us who are sceptical about the analytic/synthetic distinction will, no
doubt, nd these consequences [the problem of deduction] less unpalatable than
will those who accept it. And those of us who take a tolerant attitude to nonstandard logics  who regard logic as a theory, revisable, like other theories, in
the light of experience  may even nd these consequences welcome. (118)
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circularity to incorporate a priori justication 19 .

3

Formal Language Skepticism II: The Rule-Following
Paradox

3.1

Wittgenstein: On Rules of Language

In 185 of Philosophical Investigations (PI), Wittgenstein refers to
a story introduced earlier in 143 that investigates the notion of

rule-following and its relation to meaning-constitution. A student
was instructed by his master to write down a series of the form:

{0, n, 2n, 3n, ...}

lows the order of

(+n). Hence, if the student fol(+2), he will get the following series {0, 2, 4, 6, ...}.

at the order of

Suppose the student wrote down that series up to 1000, then he
was asked to continue the series  beyond 1000  following the same

(+2) rule. Strangely, the pupil started continuing the series with
{1000, 1004, 1008, 1012, ...}. When the master warned the student
that he is continuing the series with wrong numbers, the student
replied that he is following the same rule since the beginning of the
series-counting process, and hence he cannot be mistaken. Wittgenstein writes:
Now we get the pupil to continue a series (say +2) beyond
1000  and he writes 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012. We say to
him: `Look what you've done!'  He doesn't understand.
We say: `You were meant to add two look how you began
the series!'  He answers: `Yes, isn't it right? I thought
that was how I was meant to do it.'

 Or suppose

he pointed to the series and said: `But I went on in the
same way.'  It would now be no use to say: `But can't
you see .
19 One

inference

.

.

.

?'

 and repeat the old examples and

proposed solution to the problem of deduction is to distinguish between
and

logical implications

from (p and (if

p

then

q )),

necessary

q

however this rule  in itself  is not a truth-bearer. Dierently, a

logical implication like if ` p' and `if
specifying a

rules of

. A rule of inference like modus ponens allows us to infer

p

then

q'

implies `q '  is a statement in the metalanguage

logical relation between the premises and the conclusion of the object

language (i.e. the rule of inference). Thus, the premise-circularity problem is the mere result
of treating logical implications as rules of inferences. We think this solution is vulnerable to
Haack's criticisms as there is still no defense of the validity of the metalanguage. There are
also other resolutions like the one proposed by Gilbert Ryle (1945, 6) who suggested that
Carroll's regress problem is the result of confusing `knowing-how' with `knowing-that'. Ryle
basically argues that knowing the rules of inference (viz. `knowing-that') is not a
condition for being able to implement these rules in practice (viz. `knowing-how').
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sucient

explanations. In such a case we might say, perhaps: It
comes natural to this person to understand our order with
our explanations as we should understand the order: `Add
2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000 and so on.' (185,

PI )
Wittgenstein thinks that the student's behavior might be considered
as a special interpretation of the rule

(+2)

according to which the

student understands to add 2 up to 1000, add 4 up to 2000, add 6
up to 3000, etc. Therefore, the student was conforming to the rule
when he produced 1004 as the number following 1000 in the series.
This story is brought up to point out that following a rule is not

sucient for understanding the meaning of that rule. Wittgenstein
writes:
How is it decided what is the right step to take at any
particular stage?  `The right step is the one that accords
with the order  as it was meant '  So when you gave the
order +2 you meant that he was to write 1002 after 1000
 and did you also mean that he should write 1868 after
1866, and 100036 after 100034, and so on  an innite
number of such propositions?  `No: what I meant was,
that he should write the next but one number after every
number that he wrote; and from this all those propositions
follow in turn.'

 But that is just what is in question:

what, at any stage, does follow from that sentence.

Or,

again, what, at any stage we are to call `being in accord'
with that sentence (and with the meaning you then put
into the sentence  whatever that may have consisted
in).

It would almost be more correct to say, not that

an intuition was needed at every stage, but that a new
decision was needed at every stage. (186, PI )
The crux of the problem can be summarized in the following questions: what determines the meaning of a rule?

And who decides

which meaning to ascribe to a rule? Since there are innite situations to which we can apply  almost  any rule, and humans have
a nite capacity, then it might be dicult to determine what a rule
means at each single new situation. That is why Wittgenstein considers that attaching a meaning to a rule is not a matter of intuition,
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but a matter of decision that is needed to be made in every new situation. Hence, the generation of the number 1002 after 1000 is in
accordance with

(+2),

but other numbers are possible as well. Saul

Kripke, among others, has interpreted Wittgenstein as presenting
a skeptical paradox regarding the meanings of rules of languages,
which we are going to discuss next.
3.2

Kripke's Skeptical Paradox

In this section we introduce Saul Kripke's main thoughts about the
previously discussed ideas of Wittgenstein on rule-following. Kripke
presents his ideas in his inuential book Wittgenstein on Rules and

Private Languages (WRPL) which was an exposition on some of the
Wittgensteinian ideas in Philosophical Investigations .

It is worth

noting that there is a wide disagreement in the literature concerning
the question whether Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein's passages on
rule-following as developing and aiming at a skeptical paradox really
corresponds to Wittgenstein's intentions. That is why the literature
refers to WRPL as Kripkenstein . In this thesis, we are interested
in the rule-following paradox on its own as presented in WRPL 
as an original problem in the philosophy of language  regardless of
Wittgenstein's original intentions. Kripke writes:
In the following, I am largely trying to present Wittgenstein's argument, or, more accurately, that set of problems
and arguments which I personally have gotten out of reading Wittgenstein. With few exceptions, I am not trying to
present views of my own; neither am I trying to endorse or
to criticize Wittgenstein's approach . . . Probably many of
my formulations and recastings of the argument are done
in a way Wittgenstein would not himself approve. So the
present paper should be thought of as expounding neither
`Wittgenstein's' argument nor `Kripke's': rather Wittgenstein's argument as it struck Kripke, as it presented a problem for him. (5)
Recall that the problem arose when the master considered the series
(1000, 1004, 1008, 1012 . . . ) that the the pupil  according to what
he was taking to be the proper interpretation of the rule (+2)  had
constructed, to be the result of a mistake .

Kripke interprets the

story as a skeptical paradox about meaning-constitution in general,
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and rule-following in particular. The problem for Kripke is that any
rule can be restated in a way to make any act performed conform
to it. So the student in the Wittgensteinian story has a special interpretation for

(+2)

that means add 2 to up to 1000, then add 4

above 1000. A straightforward response is that the student's interpretation is not possible, simply because our rule (+2) means add
2 for all integers, and not just up to 1000. Unfortunately, it turns
out that such response will not succeed for reasons stated later. In
201 Wittgenstein states this was our paradox: no course of action
could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can
be made out to accord with the rule. Kripke considers this paradox
as the central problem of PI . He restates the problem as follows:
I, like almost all English speakers, use the word `plus' and
the symbol `+' to denote a well-known mathematical function, addition. The function is dened for all pairs of positive integers.

By means of my external symbolic repre-

sentation and my internal mental representation, I `grasp'
the rule for addition. One point is crucial to my `grasp' of
this rule. Although I myself have computed only nitely
many sums in the past, the rule determines my answer for
indenitely many new sums that I have never previously
considered. This is the whole point of the notion that in
learning to add I grasp a rule: my past intentions regarding addition determine a unique answer for indenitely
many new cases in the future. (8)
Here, Kripke is spelling out the intuitive angst that we might have
after considering the Wittgensteinian story.

We all know that we

applied any rule (whether mathematical or not) only to a nite
number of cases in the past.

But we moreover hold an implicit

assumption  which is contained in our grasp of the meaning of
`rule'  namely, that the rule under consideration can be applied
to an innite number of cases in the future. What Kripke will do
next is challenge that intuition by constructing an ingenious thought
experiment that puts into doubt the conviction that we can ascribe
a stable meaning for a specic sign in any language 20 . Kripke's
thought experiment goes as follows:

imagine a student who has

never performed any addition operation for numbers greater than
20 Kripke's

argument is equally valid for natural languages as it is for formal languages.
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57, and he was then asked `what is the value of 68 plus 57?' The
student responds by doing the arithmetic as he was taught before
and produced the answer `125.'

This is true for the student not

only in the arithmetic sense, but also in the metalinguistic sense
as the student is using the term `plus' to denote a function to the
eect that `57+68' should produce `125.' Now a skeptic comes to the
student and suggests that perhaps his past usage of the term `plus'
should produce `5' instead of `125.' To justify his claim the skeptic
suggests that since the student only performed additions of numbers
less than 57, then this is a complete new application of the `plus'
function. In other words, the skeptic is doubting the legitimacy of
extending our usage of `plus' as `+' from all

n−1

cases to the

nth

case. So it might be the case that the student's past usage of the
terms `plus' and `+' denotes a function called quus denoted by

Θ:

{
xΘy = x + y if x, y < 57
{
xΘy = 5 if otherwise
The quus function ts perfectly to the student's past usage of the
`plus' term, and there is no logical reason to reject it since it is the
rst time for the student to experiment the addition of two numbers
greater than 57. Again, the student's common sense response is to
reject the skeptic's argument by claiming that when he used the
term `plus' he meant `plus' and not `quus.'

It only remains for

the student to demonstrate how his intention for a specic meaning
aected his past usage of the term, and here, as we shall now see,
the paradox immediately becomes manifest. Kripke writes:
Now if the sceptic proposes his hypothesis sincerely, he
is crazy; such a bizarre hypothesis as the proposal that I
always meant quus is absolutely wild. Wild it indubitably
is, no doubt it is false; but if it is false, there must be some
fact about my past usage that can be cited to refute it.
For although the hypothesis is wild, it does not seem to
be a priori impossible. (9)
Thus, the diculty lies in the absence of any fact concerning the
student's past usage that would favour the operation `addition' over
the operation `quaddition' (viz. the operation involving quus). But
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since quaddition is not impossible a priori, and there is no fact about
the student's past behavior that rules out quaddition, `quaddition'
remains an equally valid interpretation of `+' as `plus'. Kripke considers the instruction of counting as a natural candidate for solving
the problem.

Thus when asked about the value of ` x

+ y =?',

the

student can just count (using his ngers for instance) the value of

x,

then the value of

y,

then combine both and count the total. This

is a very natural way of avoiding addition and produces the same
result.

Nevertheless, it is obvious that this procedure falls under

the skeptic's re too. The skeptic responds by claiming that maybe
the student was using the term `count' to mean quount which is
a process that means `count' if one is joining two heaps that are
individually less than 57, otherwise count `5' if each heap is 57 or
more. It is clear that the skeptic can apply this strategy recursively
to any simpler terms that might be used to avoid addition or counting. To take it even further, Kripke extends this paradox to natural
language, and not just to mathematical operations or logical rules.
Of course, these problems apply throughout language and
are not conned to mathematical examples, though it is
with mathematical examples that they can be most smoothly
brought out. I think that I have learned the term `table' in
such a way that it will apply to indenitely many future
items.

So I can apply the term to a new situation, say

when I enter the Eiel Tower for the rst time and see a
table at the base.

Can I answer a sceptic who supposes

that by `table' in the past I meant tabair, where a `tabair'
is anything that is a table not found at the base of the
Eiel Tower, or a chair found there? (19)
The central question now is: is there any way for the non-skeptic
to weigh `plus' over `quus' ? At rst glance it seems that there are
many answers to this question. However, Kripke thinks that there
are only two possible candidates, mental facts and behavioral facts,
and he quickly dismisses both of them. In an attempt to solve the
problem, Kripke tries to dene the scope of the paradox:
Of course the problem can be put equivalently in terms
of the sceptical query regarding my present intent: nothing in my mental history establishes whether I meant plus
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or quus.

So formulated, the problem may appear to be

epistemological  how can anyone know which of these I
meant? Given, however, that everything in my mental history is compatible both with the conclusion that I meant
plus and with the conclusion that I meant quus, it is clear
that the skeptical challenge is not really an epistemological
one. (21)
Although the skeptical problem seems to be an epistemological one
(i.e. how do I know that what I meant in the past by `+' was `plus'
and not `quus' ?), it is more of a constitutive one. It is not about
our inability to nd the right epistemological path to generate xed
meanings for terms; rather, there might be no potential candidates
for meaning-constitutive facts at all. The main challenge for Kripke
then is to show that there are no meaning-constitutive facts by eliminating all possible candidates.
According to Boghossian (1989), Kripke rejects all candidates
because they do not satisfy at least one of these two criteria: (i)
meaning is normative ; (ii) meaning is innitary .

Concerning the

normativity criterion, if the student means `plus' by `+', then this
state of aairs indicates how the student ought to apply `plus,' not
how the student will apply `plus.' Concerning the innitary criterion, we can think of the meaning of any term as having an innitary
character which means that it could be applied to an innite number of cases. So if the student means `plus' by `+', then there is an
innite number of true states of aairs to which he can apply `plus.'
Kripke uses these two criteria mainly to reject the dispositionalist
account of meaning which argues that individual dispositions determine the factuality of meanings. A dispositionalist position fails
normativity since it simply tells us what individuals would do, and
not what they ought to do. Dispositionalism will also leave no room
for individual mistakes as it denes what we are supposed to get
from following a rule by what we actually got from following that
rule, and hence leaves no possibility for mistakes.

Moreover, dis-

positionalism also fails the innitary criterion; Kripke argues that
since we are nite beings (in nite time), we can only hold a nite
sum of dispositions which fails to capture the meaning of `+' 21 .
21 A

conventionalist theory of meaning can satisfy Kripke's twofold criteria. We defend such

position in sections 6 and 8.
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4

The Brain-in-a-Vat and the A Priori

Historically, Descartes was aware of the possibility of doubting our
a priori knowledge. In Mediation I of his Meditations on First Phi-

losophy , he wrote:
And, besides, as I sometimes imagine that others deceive
themselves in the things which they think they know best,
how do I know that I am not deceived every time that I
add two and three, or count the sides of a square, or judge
of things yet simpler, if anything simpler can be imagined?
(8)
He even considered, in Meditation III , the possibility that God has
created him in a way to be deceived regarding a priori knowledge:
But when I took anything very simple and easy in the
sphere of arithmetic or geometry into consideration, e.g.
that two and three together made ve, and other things
of the sort, were not these present to my mind so clearly
as to enable me to arm that they were true? Certainly
if I judged that since such matters could be doubted, this
would not have been so for any other reason than that
it came into my mind that perhaps a God might have
endowed me with such a nature that I may have been
deceived even concerning things which seemed to me most
manifest. (13)
The core of Descartes' argument is to show the plausibility of producing knowledge  out of a skeptical scenario  that is subjectively
indistinguishable from his knowledge of a priori propositions while
actually being false; as they are the product of deception 22 . In this
22 Descartes

cogito ergo sum
I am thinking, therefore I exist

attempted to refute skepticism through his notable

He wrote:
Accordingly, this piece of knowledge

argument.

is the

rst and most certain of all to occur to anyone who philosophizes in an orderly
way. (

Principles of Philosophy

, 195)

And,
So that after having reected well and carefully examined all things, we must
come to the denite conclusion that this proposition: I am, I exist, is necessarily
true each time that I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive it. (

II

, 9)

19

Meditation

section we are interested in a dierent skeptical scenario regarding a
priori knowledge. The goal is to propose a modied version of the ex-

ternal world brain-in-a-vat (Ex-BIV) skeptical scenario to generate
a similar skeptical scenario about a priori knowledge 23 . Generally
speaking, we can think of two types of skepticism regarding the a
priori. The rst can be taken to be an empiricist commitment to
knowledge (viz. that all knowledge is a posteriori )24 . The proponents of this kind of skepticism regards `self-evident' propositions
as knowledge, but disagree with the rationalists about the warrant
of these propositions. The second type of skepticism, which we are
interested in, is more radical as it questions whether we can have a
priori knowledge in the rst place. The a priori brain-in-a-vat (ApBIV) is a thought experiment about a brain-in-a-vat that is being
tricked regarding a priori knowledge. The main diculty that faces
a priori skepticism  in its second sense  is related to metaphysical
modality concerns.

Many philosophers can accept the plausibility

of Ex-BIV skeptical hypothesis since any proposition about the external world seems to be a contingent proposition.

On the other

hand, the Ap-BIV skeptical scenario seems to be prima facie logi-

cally impossible since it deals with necessary propositions. Another
diculty is that Ap-BIV seems to be self-refuting as the skeptic has
to use a form of a priori justication  based on a priori knowledge
 to construct a valid Ap-BIV scenario. The last objection is best
articulated in the words of Matthias Steup:
It is generally agreed that PAPS 25 are knowable. There is
skepticism about knowledge of the external world, other
minds, and the past.

Skepticism about PAPS, however,

is rarely pursued. Indeed, considering that knowledge of
PAPS includes knowledge of the laws of logic, and more
specically, knowledge of an argument's validity, it is hard
to see how a skeptical argument for anything could get o
the ground without the prior assumption that knowledge
of PAPS is indeed possible. So the knowability of PAPS
is not at issue. (2005, 10-11)
23 The

brain-in-a-vat argument might be regarded as the modern formulation of the Carte-

sian Evil Demon.

It was rst introduced in Hilary Putnam's

Reason, Truth and History

(1981) in which he used semantic externalism to argue against a version of the brain-in-a-vat
hypothesis.

24 See,
25 Viz.

for example, Kitcher (1992), Kornblith (2000) and Devitt (2005).
`putatively a priori propositions'.
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Nevertheless, James Beebe (2011) provides a response to the selfdefeating objection raised by Steup:
Ordinarily, when we put forward philosophical arguments,
we want to be able to know that our premises are true and
that they support our conclusions. If the conclusion of an
argument undermines our ability to know the premises,
one of these common epistemic goals will be thwarted.
However, in the case of skeptical arguments, showing that
we lack knowledge of a certain kind is the central goal.
Thus, if it turns out that a skeptical argument shows that
we cannot even have knowledge of the premises of that
argument, that may be no objection to the argument. If
leading us by a plausible train of reasoning to a point
where it appears that we cannot have knowledge of the
premises we started with was part of the very goal of the
skeptical argument, our resulting inability to know them
is a sign the argument has succeeded not a sign that it
has failed. (599-600, emphasis added)
An extensive discussion of a priori skepticism can be found in Beebe
(2011) and Willenken (2015) upon which we are going to rely in our
exposition.

Denition 7.

(Ap-BIV Skeptical Hypothesis): Let Ap be any a priori
′
proposition, and let the skeptical hypothesis Sh be: `I am Ap-BIV'.

Sh′ .



P1 :

I am unable to know the denials of



P2 :

If I am unable to know the denials of

Sh′ ,

then I do not

know that Ap is true.



C:

Hence, I do not know that Ap is true.

The rst premise can be supported using the notion of Dretskean
sensitivity 26 .

Denition 8.

(Dretskean Sensitivity):

true, then subject

S

26 See Dretske (1971) and
27 This formulation is due

If a proposition
would not believe P 27 .

Nozick (1981).
to Pritchard (2016).
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P

was not

The Dretskean sensitivity condition can be thought of as a modal
criterion for assessing the truth of beliefs. It requires the subject to
recognize her false beliefs by appealing to the nearest possible worlds .
That means that if

S

believes

near possible world where

P is false
W ′ where S

if

in a world
believes

P

S

W,

P,

and

P

is false, then there exists a

would not believe

P.

Put dierently,

and there exists a near possible world

to be false, then

P

is a Dretskean sensitive

propositional knowledge. For instance, assume that

S

lives in our

where water is formed of H2 O . Now we can
′
conceive of another close possible world W where everything else is
′
almost the same except that water is formed of H5 O . In W , S would
ordinary world

W

easily know that her belief of water being

H2 O  say after consulting

a chemistry textbook  is false. Therefore, Dretskean sensitivity is
a scheme to sort out false beliefs from true ones by appealing to the
modal notion of possible worlds.

Clearly, the proposition I know

that I am not Ap-BIV is not Dretskean sensitive since in the nearest
′
possible world W , I will not be able to know its falsehood because
I am already being deceived by Ap-BIV. Therefore, the skeptic can
defend

P1

in the Ap-BIV skeptical hypothesis by arguing that

is not Dretskean sensitive, and hence cannot be falsied 28 .

P2

P1

Also,

of the Ap-BIV skeptical hypothesis can be justied based on the

assumption that knowledge is closed under entailment.

Denition 9.
that

P

(Closure Principle): If subject

entails

Q,

then

S

knows that

S

knows

P,

and knows

Q.

The closure principle only demands the subject to know the logical

consequences of proposition

P.

For example, knowing that Adam

is a wearing a shirt is a logical consequence of knowing that Adam
is wearing a black shirt. Similarly, I know that I am not Ap-BIV
is a logical consequence of the proposition I know that 2+5=7 is
true, as knowing the latter implies knowing the former. Hence the
skeptic can endorse

P2 by endorsing the closure principle.

These two

justications (viz. Dretskean sensitivity and the closure principle)
can be objected on several grounds; however, an extensive discussion
28 In

a similar fashion to Hempel's (1945) paradox of the ravens, an objection can be raised

against

P1

by undermining the notion of Dretskean sensitivity. Let us think of the following

truth-condition: if

S

believes

P,

then

P

is true. Prima facie, this truth-condition is very weak

as it allows almost any proposition to be true. But, this truth-condition is

logically equivalent

to Dretskean sensitivity. Thus, if we do not accept this truth condition, we ought to reject
the Dretskean sensitivity criterion.
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of them is beyond the scope of this essay 29 . As discussed above, the
Ap-BIV scenario is presented as a paradox: two acceptable premises
and an unacceptable conclusion.
Commonly, we can think of two categories of paradoxes:

con-

tradictory and non-contradictory . The former type comes with the
format of the sorites paradoxes where the conclusion takes the form
of a contradiction (e.g. showing
be accepted.

P

and not

P ),

and hence cannot

The liar's paradox is an example of this.

says I am lying, it means that he is not lying.

If a liar

Similarly, if he

says I am not lying, it means he is lying. On the other hand, in
non-contradictory paradoxes we reach a conclusion that is not contradictory, but simply `absurd' in some sense.

An example would

be the conclusion of the Ap-BIV skeptical hypothesis 30 .

5

Apriority and Modality

5.1

Apriority

In his celebrated Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), Kant makes a
fundamental distinction between three conceptually-related oppositions: the rst is the distinction between a priori and a posteriori
knowledge31 , the second is the distinction between necessary and
contingent propositions, and the third is the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions 32 . In the introduction of the rst
edition of CPR, Kant denes a priori knowledge as being independent of experience as opposed to a posteriori knowledge which is
borrowed solely from experience. He writes:
Experience tells us, indeed, what is, but not that it must
necessarily be so, and not otherwise.

It therefore gives

us no true universality; and reason, which is so insistent
upon this kind of knowledge, is therefore more stimulated
by it than satised. Such universal modes of knowledge,
29 See

Pritchard (2008) for a discussion on sensitivity-based theories in contemporary episte-

mology, and see Kvanvig (2006) for a general discussion of the dierent versions of the closure
principle.

Also, refer to Leite (2004) for a critical refutation of the closure principle as a

foundational concept in the skeptical argument.

30 If

someone subscribes to the view that Ap-BIV skeptical hypothesis is self-refuting, then

indeed it will be a contradictory paradox.

31 Cf.
32 Cf.

CPR, A 2/B 2.
CPR, A 6/B 10  A 10/B 14.
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which at the same time possess the character of inner necessity, must in themselves, independently of experience,
be clear and certain. They are therefore entitled knowledge a priori ; whereas, on the other hand, that which is
borrowed solely from experience is, as we say, known only
a posteriori , or empirically. (A2) 33
When claiming that a priori knowledge is a type of knowledge that
is independent of experience 34 , Kant is not claiming that we would
have reached this knowledge if we had no experience at all. On the
contrary, Kant takes experience to be a prerequisite for all knowledge
acquisition, including a priori knowledge. Rather, what he means is
that experience is not a constitutive part of our a priori knowledge.
He writes:
There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with
experience. For how should our faculty of knowledge be
awakened into action did not objects aecting our senses
partly of themselves produce representations partly arouse
the activity of our understanding to compare these representations, and, by combining or separating them, work
up the raw material of the sensible impressions into that
knowledge of objects which is entitled experience? In the
order of time, therefore, we have no knowledge antecedent
to experience, and with experience all our knowledge begins.

But though all our knowledge begins with experi-

ence, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience.
(B1)
The two criteria for a priori knowledge, according to Kant, are:
necessity and strict universality 35 . Concerning necessity, he writes:
33 All translations of
34 The Kantian view

metic

CPR

are from Smith (1929).

can also be summed up in Frege's words in

:
[When we classify a proposition as

a priori

The Foundations of Arith-

,] this is not a judgment about the

conditions, psychological, physiological, and physical, which have made it possible for us to form the content of the proposition in our consciousness; nor is it
a judgment about the way in which some other man has come . . . to believe it
to be true; rather, it is a judgment about the ultimate ground upon which rests
the justication for holding it to be true. (3)

35 It

thetic

is worth noting that Kant distinguishes between

analytic

judgments a priori and

syn-

judgments a priori. The criterium for synthetic judgments a priori is that these function
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Experience teaches us that a thing is so and so, but not
that it cannot be otherwise.

First, then, if we have a

proposition which in being thought is thought as neces-

sary , it is an a priori judgment; and if, besides, it is not
derived from any proposition except one which also has
the validity of a necessary judgment, it is an absolutely a

priori judgment. (B3)
Apparently then, experience can only inform us about contingent
propositions.

However, thinking about a proposition as necessary

is a sucient condition for being a priori.

In addition, Kant dis-

tinguishes between a priori judgment(s) which can be derived from
other unnecessary proposition(s), and absolutely a priori judgment(s)
which is derived only from other necessary proposition(s). The second criterion for a priori knowledge is strict universality ,
If, then, a judgment is thought with strict universality,
that is, in such manner that no exception is allowed as
possible, it is not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely a priori ... Necessity and strict universality are
thus sure criteria of a priori knowledge, and are inseparable from one another. (B4)
In recent years  probably under the inuence of Saul Kripke's work
 there have been some attempts to disentangle apriority from necessity. Hence, apriority was dened in other terms 36 :

Denition 10.
S' s

belief

P

(PK1):

S 's

belief

P

is justied a priori if and only if

is non-experientially justied 37 and cannot be defeated

as conditions of the possibility of experience,
The highest principle of all synthetic judgments is therefore this: every object
stands under the necessary conditions of synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience. Synthetic a priori judgments are thus possible
when we relate the formal conditions of a priori intuition, the synthesis of imagination and the necessary unity of this synthesis in a transcendental apperception,
to a possible empirical knowledge in general. We then assert that the conditions
of the possibility of experience in general are likewise conditions of the possibility
of the objects of experience, and that for this reason they have objective validity
in a synthetic a priori judgment. (A 158/B197)
General pure logic (cf.

CPR A 50/B 74 .)

constitutes an analytic theory of the form

of thought which completely abstracts from its contents, whereas transcendental logic does
not completely abstract from the objective validity of thought, but rather inquires into its
conditions, for its main task see A 154/B 193. Thus, whereas the law of non-contradiction is
the highest principle of all judgments (cf. B189), transcendental logic explains the possibility
of synthetic judgments a priori. (A 154/ B193)

36 See for instance, Putnam (1983) and Kitcher (1983).
37 I.e. P is justied by a source that is non-experiential.
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by experience.
Alberto Casullo (2012) objects to PK1 based on a series of arguments, and proposes instead a weaker version of PK1:

Denition 11.
belief

P

(C1)

S 's

belief

P

is justied a priori if and only if

S 's

is non-experientially justied.

Clearly, C1 is weaker than PK1 (since PK1 implies C1, and not the
opposite). Henceforth we are going to adopt C1 as our denition of
a priori knowledge 38 .
5.2

Apriority and Necessity

As mentioned above, Kant distinguishes between necessity and contingency. So although it is true that `I am writing my thesis right
now'; it is also true (and thus possible) that I could have been doing
something else. Nevertheless, it seems dicult to imagine that `2+2
=5' could have been true in any plausible way. The former type can
be labeled as contingent propositions while the latter can be labeled
as necessary propositions. Kant writes that experience alone cannot tell us about necessity and strict universality: Experience tells
us, indeed, what is, but not that it must necessarily be so, and not
otherwise. It therefore gives us no true universality. 39  From such
statements we can infer that Kant thinks:



(KP1) If

P

is a priori true then

P

P

is a posteriori true then

is a necessary proposition.

And similarly,



(KP2) If
tion40 .

P

is a contingent proposi-

The sucient condition of necessity expressed in KP1 follows trivially since Kant describes necessity and strict universality as the two
fundamental properties of the a priori. Nonetheless, it turns out that

both KP1 and the other direction of KP1 (viz. if
proposition then

P

P

is a necessary

is true a priori) could be falsied . Kripke (1971,

1980) took the lead in breaking the Kantian equivalence between necessity and a priority by claiming that there might be (i) contingent
38 Note that we can make a leap from a priori justication to a priori knowledge by preserving
the other knowledge-conditions.

39 CPR, A2.
40 See Van Cleve

(1999) for example.
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a priori propositions, and (ii) necessary a posteriori propositions 41 .
He writes in lecture 1 of Naming and Necessity :
Philosophers have talked . . . [about] various categories of
truth, which are called ` a priori ,' `analytic,' `necessary'. . .
The terms are often used as if whether there are things answering to these concepts is an interesting question, but
we might as well regard them all as meaning the same
thing . . . Consider what the traditional characterizations
of such terms as ` a priori ' and `necessary' are. First the
notion of a prioricity is a concept of epistemology. I guess
the traditional characterization from Kant goes something
like:

a priori truths are those which can be known in-

dependently of any experience . . .

I will say that some

philosophers somehow change the modality in this characterization from can to must . They think that if something
belongs to the realm of a priori knowledge, it couldn't possibly be known empirically. This is just a mistake. Something may belong in the realm of such statements that can
be known a priori but still may be known by particular
people on the basis of experience. (34-35)
Then he adds concerning necessity,
The second concept which is in question is that of necessity. Sometimes this is used in an epistemological way
and might then just mean a priori . . . But what I am concerned with here is a notion which is not a notion of epistemology but of metaphysics . . . We ask whether something
might have been true, or might have been false. Well, if
something is false, it's obviously not necessarily true.
it is true, might it have been otherwise?

If

Is it possible

that, in this respect, the world should have been dierent
from the way it is?

If the answer is `no,' then this fact

about the world is a necessary one. If the answer is `yes,'
then this fact about the world is a contingent one. This in
and of itself has nothing to do with anyone's knowledge of
anything. It's certainly a philosophical thesis, and not a
matter of obvious denitional equivalence, either that everything a priori is necessary or that everything necessary
41 It

goes without saying that Kripke's thesis is controversial, see (Laporte 2016).
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is a priori . . .

But at any rate they are dealing with two

dierent domains, two dierent areas, the epistemological
and the metaphysical. (35-36)
As seen above, Kripke strikes harshly against confusing the epistemological with the metaphysical. Following this division, Kripke is
ready to present his thesis: (i) there are contingent a priori propositions, and (ii) there are necessary a posteriori propositions.

We

start by investigating (ii).

5.2.1 Necessary A Posteriori Propositions
In the preface of Naming and Necessity , Kripke argues for the necessity of identities using Leibniz's law of indiscernibility of identicals 42 :
Already when I worked on modal logic it had seemed to
me, as Wiggins has said, that the Leibnitzian principle of
the indiscernibility of identicals was as self-evident as the
law of contradiction . . .

it was clear from

(x)  (x = x)

and Leibnitz's law that identity is an `internal' relation:

(x)(y)(x = y ⊃ x = y)

(3)

So Kripke's task now is to show that we can have a posteriori necessary identities. In order to do this, he coined the notion of rigid

designator (although the concept had previously been used by some
philosophers).



RD (Rigid Designator): A rigid designator is a term that des-

ignates the same object in all possible worlds 43 .

Think of the following statement `Hesperus = Phosphorus' which is
a true identity statement. `Hesperus' is the name given, in Greek
mythology, to an evening star; while `Phosphorus' is the term given
to a morning star. During ancient Greek times, these two heavenly
bodies were thought to be dierent, but later astronomers discovered
that both terms refer to the same object, namely Venus.

Clearly

the identity `Hesperus = Phosphorus' was only known to be true, a
posteriori.
42 For property F and objects x
43 There is no consensus on the

and

y,

we have

x = y→ ∀F (F x ↔ F y)

nature of these possible worlds (c.f.

Menzel 2016).

Nev-

ertheless, here we can think of them, in the most general sense, as `plausible counterfactual
scenarios.'
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So two things are true: rst, that we do not know a priori that Hesperus is Phosphorus, and are in no position
to nd out the answer except empirically. Second, this is
so because we could have evidence qualitatively indistinguishable from the evidence we have and determine the
reference of the two names by the positions of two planets
in the sky, without the planets being the same. (104)
So does that mean that `Hesperus = Phosphorus' is contingently
true?

Kripke's answer is `no.'

The identity statement `Hesperus

= Phosphorus' is necessarily true (in the metaphysical sense) as it
is an identity of two rigid designators .

To see this, note that the

rst proper name `Hesperus' designates one object in all possible
worlds (viz. Venus). By the same token, the second proper name
`Phosphorus' designates also the same object in all possible worlds
(viz.

Venus).

Therefore, if the identity `Hesperus = Phosphorus'

is true then it is necessarily true, since `Venus=Venus' is necessarily true in all possible worlds. Now consider the following identity
statement `Hesperus = the brightest non-lunar heavenly body in the
evening sky.' This statement is true but not necessarily true. This
is because the term `the brightest non-lunar heavenly body in the
evening sky' is not a rigid designator as we can perfectly conceive
another possible world  dierent from our actual world  where
`the brightest non-lunar heavenly body in the evening sky' designates `Mars' for instance. Hence, this identity is true regarding our
actual world, but not necessarily true regarding all possible worlds.
In addition to identity statements with proper names, Kripke shows
other categories of statements to be necessary a posteriori like (i)
identities involving natural kinds 44 , and (ii) attributions of essential
properties to objects 45 .
There are many objections to Kripke's conclusions. A solid critique comes from direct reference theorists (e.g. Soames (2002) 46 ,
and Salmon (1986) 47 ). According to them, we are allowed to think
of directly-referring terms as terms that lack any descriptive characterization of the referent. Based on this, statements like `Hesperus =
Phosphorus' and `Hesperus = Hesperus' are non-dierentiable since
44 C.f.
45 C.f.
46 Pp.
47 Pp.

pp. 116-126.
pp. 110-115.
240-243.
133142.
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they pick out the same referent.

By stripping away the descrip-

tive characterization of `Hesperus = Phosphorus' and of `Hesperus
= Hesperus', both statements turn out to be the same. But since
`Hesperus = Hesperus' can be known a priori, then `Hesperus =
Phosphorus' can also be known a priori 48 .

5.2.2 Contingent A Priori Propositions
Kripke presents his thoughts about this category of propositions using the `standard meter' example. He hypothesizes that `one meter'
is the length of

S,

S

where

is an arbitrary stick in Paris. To avoid

any discrepancies in length because of time, Kripke xes the length
at time

t0 .

The question now is: `Is it a necessary truth that

one meter long at

t0 ?'

S

is

Kripke answers as follows:

Someone who thinks that everything one knows a priori is
necessary might think: `This is the denition of a meter.
By denition, stick

S

is one meter long at

t0 .

That's a

necessary truth.' But there seems to me to be no reason so
to conclude, even for a man who uses the stated denition
of `one meter.' For he's using this denition not to give
the meaning of what he called the `meter,' but to x the
reference. (54-55)
Hence, the role of the denition here is not meaning-ascription, but
reference-xing.

Moreover, the object we used for reference-xing

is just accidental . In other words, it just happened that

S

had the

exact length we wanted to describe at t0 ; but it could have happened
′
that another object S was the correct reference-xing tool.
. . . There is a certain length which he wants to mark out.
He marks it out by an accidental property, namely that
there is a stick of that length. Someone else might mark
out the same reference by another accidental property.
48 In

a similar fashion to Kripke, Quine argued against direct reference theorists. Consider

the following example from Quine (1970):



(i) All cordates are cordates.



(ii) All cordates are renates

Assume that both statements are true. Then for a reference theorist, (i) and (ii) are identical
statements as they have the same reference.

Nevertheless, there seems to be an intuitive

semantic dierence between (i) and (ii). Statement (i) expresses that all creatures with hearts
are creatures with hearts, while statement (ii) expresses that all creatures with hearts are
creatures with kidneys.
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But in any case, even though he uses this to x the reference of his standard of length, a meter, he can still say,
`if heat had been applied to this stick S at
stick

S

t0 ,

then at

t0

would not have been one meter long.' (55)

Kripke's thought can be analyzed using rigid designators. The identity was dened as: `the length of

S

at

t0 =

one meter'. The `one

meter' term is a rigid designator as it points out to the same length
in all possible worlds.

On the other hand, `the length of

S

at

t0 '

is not a rigid designator as it might designate dierent lengths at
dierent worlds depending on

S

and

t0 .

But a simple answer to the question is this: Even if this
is the only standard of length that he uses, there is an intuitive dierence between the phrase `one meter' and the
phrase `the length of

S

at

t0 .'

The rst phrase is meant

to designate rigidly a certain length in all possible worlds,
which in the actual world happens to be the length of the
stick

S

at

t0 .

On the other hand `the length of

S

at

t0 '

does not designate anything rigidly. In some counterfactual situations the stick might have been longer and in
some shorter, if various stresses and strains had been applied to it. (55)
From this discussion, Kripke concludes that the statement ` S is one
meter long at

t0 '

is contingently a priori .

What then, is the epistemological status of the statement
`Stick

S

is one meter long at t0 ,' for someone who has xed

the metric system by reference to stick

S

? It would seem

that he knows it a priori. For if he used stick

S

to x the

reference of the term `one meter,' then as a result of this
kind of `denition' . . .

he knows automatically, without

further investigation, that

S

is one meter long. (56)

It goes without saying that the a priority of ` S is one meter long
at

t0 '

is only known to the subject who proposed this denition.

However, it seems dicult for anyone else who was not involved
in the reference-xing procedure to know a priori that ` S is one
meter long at t0 .' But this dierentiability in the epistemic status of
Kripke's denition is not worrying since all what he needs to show is
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that the class of contingent a priori statements is non-empty . After
Kripke, some philosophers extended the category of contingent a
priori statements to include other categories like indexicals 49 .
5.3

More on Rigidity

In this section we are going to investigate Kripke's notion of rigidity more extensively and discuss some of its possible implications.
We are going to focus mainly on proper names, nevertheless, our
results are extendable to a large category of rigid designators.

At

rst, Kripke distinguishes between two types of rigidity: rigidity de
jure , and rigidity de facto 50 . The former type occurs when the designated reference is identied to be a single object in all possible
worlds by virtue of the semantic rules of language. An example of
this would be the identity statements, for instance `Nixon=Nixon.'
The proper name `Nixon' will always designate the person Nixon in
all possible worlds, if this person Nixon exists. On the other hand,
the latter type indicates what rigidity actually happens to be in
some cases where the designated object
have the property

F (x)

x

just happens to uniquely

in all possible worlds.

An example of a

de facto rigid designator is `the smallest prime' which just happens
to indicate a unique entity in all possible worlds, namely number
`two.' It is not by virtue of the semantic rules of language that the
`smallest prime' denotes `two' in all possible worlds, but because
mathematical facts are unique in all possible worlds 51 . In Nam-

ing and Necessity , Kripke intends to defend the thesis that proper
names are rigid de jure to refute descriptivism . Intuition plays an
important role in Kripke's formulation of rigidity: In these lectures,
I will argue, intuitively, that proper names are rigid designators, for
although the man (Nixon) might not have been the President, it is
not the case that he might not have been Nixon (though he might
not have been called `Nixon') 52 
According to Kripke, the intuitivity of rigidity can be gained
from simple statements (i.e.

non-modal statements).

He gives an

example to show this: assume that the meaning of `Aristotle' is `the
last great philosopher of antiquity'. Then we can have the following:
49 C.f. Braun (2015) for an extensive discussion on indexicals.
50 P. 21, ft. 21.
51 Here Kripke assumes a realist commitment to mathematics.
52 49.
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A1. Aristotle was fond of dogs.



A2. The last great philosopher of antiquity was fond of dogs.

These two sentences are simple ones (with no modal content). To
show the rigidity of `Aristotle' and the non-rigidity of `the last great
philosopher of antiquity' we can appeal to intuition about the truthvalue of A1 and A2 in counterfactual scenarios. The truth-value of
the A1 and A2 might converge or diverge in dierent possible worlds.
However, in all possible worlds, the proper name `Aristotle' will
always denote the same person. On the other hand, the term `the
last great philosopher of antiquity' might refer to dierent persons
(Plato, for example) as we move across possible worlds.

Closely

related to rigidity is the concept of necessity of identity .

Kripke

notices that there are at least three dierent senses of talking about
`necessity of identity:'
We must distinguish three distinct theses: (i) that identical objects are necessarily identical; (ii) that true identity
statements between rigid designators are necessary; (iii)
that identity statements between what we call `names' in
actual language are necessary. (4)
The rst thesis is that everything is, necessarily, identical to itself.



K1.(x)

 (x = x).

The second thesis is from modal logic; it says for every
every



y,

if

K2.

x = y,

then necessarily

x

and for

x = y.

(x)(y)[(x = y) → (x = y)].

The third thesis is about identity statements involving proper names.



K3. If

F = N,

then necessarily

F = N,

where

F

and

N

are

proper names 53 .

Building on this, we can dene rigidity and rigid names more properly as:
53 There

is some disagreement in the literature about whether (K3) follows from (K2) or

not; see Burgess (2013).
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Denition 12.

(Rigidity) A designator

D

of an object

rigid if it is the case that for any possible world

w, then D designates o in w; and (ii) if o does
D does not designate any other object o′ in w.

w:

o

is said to be

(i) if

o

exists in

not exist in

w,

then

Stanley (1997) provides three possible ways according to which

D

o.

fails to be a rigid designator of



Rd1. If

o

exits in



Rd2. If

o

exists in



Rd3. If
o′ .

o does not exists in w, and D designates another object

w,

but

w,

o

but

is not designated by

D

D.

designates another object

o′ .

Therefore,

Denition 13.

N is rigid only
under the condition that if N designates object o, then N designates
o rigidly .
(Name Rigidity thesis) A proper name

Stanley's task now is to show that the name rigidity thesis holds
indeed.

In other words, he needs to demonstrate that all proper

names are rigid designators. For that purpose he uses reductio ad

absurdum by assuming that if Rd1-Rd3 are true in case of proper
names, then we have a contradiction . Hence we have to deny that
Rd1-Rd3 hold in case of proper names, and hence conclude that
proper names are rigid designators. First, Let
object, and let

o

D

o

be the designated

be the designator. Now assume that

D

designates

and that Rd1 is true, then:



Rd1'.

Replacing

∃o[o = D ∧⋄(o
D

exists

∧ o ̸= D)]

with a proper name will result in the following state-

ment there exists someone who is Plato, and he possibly exists
without being Plato which is intuitively false.

The second case,

Rd2, also does not hold using a similar argument since it follows
directly from (Rd1'). Finally, assume that

D

designates

o

and that

Rd3 is true, then:



Rd3'.

∃o[o = D ∧ ⋄(D

Likewise, substituting

D

exists

∧ D ̸= o)]

with a proper name results in a counterin-

tuitive statement like: there exists someone who is Plato, and Plato
could possibly exist without being him. Therefore, we can conclude
that if

D

is a proper name, it designates one and only one object
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o.

5.4

The Problem of the Rigidity Thesis

In this section, we are going to point out several problems within
the rigidity thesis. Let us take the case of proper names 54 as rigid
designators. One problem is that a proper name can have more than
one bearer. Think of the name `Socrates' which points to `the master
of Plato' and to `Sócrates Brasileiro' the Brazilian football player.
When abstracted from a specic context , the proper name `Socrates'
neither picks any nor both of them at the same time. Hence, when
Alessandro says I like Socrates, it is not vivid which `Socrates'
does his proposition pick.

The absence of an inclusion/exclusion

mechanism for the designated object(s) by proper name(s) results
in the multiple bearers' problem . Nevertheless, Kripke rejects this
line of reasoning, and insists that names can be individuated by the
bearer.
Some have thought that the simple fact that two people
can have the same name refutes the rigidity thesis. It is
true that in the present monograph I spoke for simplicity
as if each name had a unique bearer.

I do not in fact

think, as far as the issue of rigidity is concerned, that
this is a major oversimplication.

I believe that many

important theoretical issues about the semantics of names
(probably not all) would be largely unaected had our
conventions required that no two things shall be given the
same name.

In particular, as I shall explain, the issue

of rigidity would be unaected. For language as we have
it, we could speak of names as having a unique referent
if we adopted a terminology, analogous to the practice of
calling homonyms distinct `words,' according to which uses
of phonetically the same sounds to name distinct objects
count as distinct names. This terminology certainly does
not agree with the most common usage, but I think it may
have a great deal to recommend it for theoretical purposes.
(7-8)
Here Kripke is suggesting an analogy between homonyms and proper
names.

So if we can think of the word `bank' (viz.

the side of

a river) as distinct from the word `bank' (viz. a modern nancial
54 Here

proper names can be considered as types and not tokens.
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institution), then we can also think of the name `Socrates' (viz. the
master of Plato) as distinct from the name `Socrates' (viz. Sócrates
Brasileiro). Hence, according to Kripke, these two names are better
thought of as completely distinct rather than being thought of as
the same word with a dierentiated semantic component. So how
can we then dierentiate their meaning? Kripke answers:
As a speaker of my idiolect, I call only one object `Aristotle,' though I am aware that other people, including the
man I call `Onassis' or perhaps `Aristotle Onassis,' had
the same given name . . .

In practice it is usual to sup-

pose that what is meant in a particular use of a sentence
is understood from the context . (9, emphasis added)
There are two main Kripkean claims here that we want to deal with.
The rst claim is that every proper name has a distinct bearer (i.e.
is designating a distinct object) in all possible worlds. The second
claim is that the semantics of proper names can be dierentiated
by referring to a specic context. There are various problems with
these two claims, which we are going to discuss in order.

Jerrold

Katz (2001) criticizes the Kripkean analogy  seen to hold  between
homonyms and proper names because it leads to some implausible
results55 :



a. Two individuals with the name `John Smith' will be mistaken
to say, on Kripke's account, some natural statements like we
have the same name or `John Smith' is my name, too.'



b.

The denite article `the' in `The Albert Einstein lived in

Princeton' will have no interpretation unless the name `Albert
Einstein' has more than one bearer.



c.

An adjective like `Junior' associated with the son's name

will be redundant.



d. If `Monica Lewinsky' marries `Kenneth Starr,' then she will
not be able to change her name to `Monica Starr.'

All of these counterintuitive scenarios  that contradict the common
use of natural language  stem directly from applying the Kripkean
55 For

the full critique, refer to Katz (2001), pp.150-152.
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thesis that distinctiveness of the referents will be a sucient condition for distinctiveness of the names 56 .
Now we will explore the second Kripkean claim concerning the
rigidity of proper names. Here he is basically claiming that when
Alice speaks about `Socrates' in a philosophy class, then we can comfortably suppose that Alice intends `Socrates-master of Plato' and

not `Socrates-Brazilian footballer.' The context imposes this understanding, and hence the proper name `Socrates' is rigid as it picks
out a unique referent in all possible worlds, namely `Socrates-master
of Plato.' Nonetheless, by pushing this contextualist approach further, it turns out that the whole notion of rigidity is facing serious
pitfalls. To see this consider the following story: World

w1

is the ac-

tual world as we know it, and hence Socrates is indeed the master of

Socrates1 .

Plato, call him

had an unfortunate accident and lost his memory. After
became hostile to philosophy. Hence in
of Plato' before

t1 ,

w2 where
t1 where he
t1 , Socrates

Now, postulate another world

Socrates was the master of Plato up to a point in time

call him

Socrates2

w2 , we have `Socrates-master
, and similarly we have an-

other `Socrates- no t master of Plato' after

t1 ,

call him

Socrates3 .

Thus, if we are back to our philosophy class and Alice says: I like
Socrates then the word `Socrates' in I like Socrates takes three
possible truth-values:



a) In

w1 ,

for all

t

`Socrates'=`Socrates1 ' and hence Alice's

proposition is true .



b) In

w2 ,

before

t1

we have `Socrates'=` Socrates2 ' and hence

Alice's proposition is true .



we have `Socrates'=` Socrates3 ' and hence
Alice's proposition is false 57 .

c) In

w3 ,

after

t1

To make her statement true in all possible worlds, Alice needs to
rephrase it  by adding a temporal restriction  to something like
I like Socrates at all

t

in

w1 ,

and before

t1

in

w2

. Only by doing

so, Alice makes sure that the proper name `Socrates' refers to the
person she intends: `Socrates-master of Plato,' and not to the other
56 8, ft.
57 Here

9.
Alice's intended `Socrates-master of Plato' is absent, and we assume that she will

not like someone who is hostile to philosophy.
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Socrates who is hostile to philosophy. But now we can see where the
argument is going, as we can construct a dierent possible world
which proceeds exactly as

w3

regained his memory at time

w4

with the exception that ` Socrates3 '

t2

and continued to tutor Plato, call

him `Socrates4 .' So now we have the following four possibilities:



a) In

w1 ,

t

for all

`Socrates'= `Socrates1 ' and hence Alice's

proposition is true .



b) In

w2 ,

before

t1

we have `Socrates'= ` Socrates2 ' and hence

Alice's proposition is true .



c) In

w3 ,

after

t1

we have `Socrates'= ` Socrates3 ' and hence

Alice's proposition is false .



d) In

w4 ,

after

t2 ,

we have `Socrates'= ` Socrates4 ' and hence

Alice's proposition is true .
Here again, Alice's general statement I like Socrates is false because of the (c) case where possibly `Socrates=

Socrates3 .'

To x

it, she needs to contextualize her statement: I like Socrates at all
in

w1 , before t1 in w2 , and after t2 in w4 .

t

Alas, we still can construct

more possible worlds with more temporal conditions ad innitum .
This means that the proper name `Socrates' in I like Socrates will
always fail to designate the intended `Socrates-master of Plato' because we need to place an innite number of restrictions (i.e. contexts) to match all possible worlds.

Stated dierently, recall that

Kripke responds to the multiple bearer's problem by arguing that
the exact sense of the proper name can be understood from the
given context, and hence there is no room for supposing that the
same proper name can designate multiple referents.

Nonetheless,

we showed that there can be an innity of contexts to be placed to
guarantee the uniqueness of the designated referent of the proper
name, and hence proper names might not be rigid at all .
5.5

Contextual Rigidity

To x the non -rigidity of proper names resulting from the possible
innity of contexts imposed, we will propose a restricted version of
rigidity, namely contextual rigidity .
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Denition 14.
Dc

(Contextual Rigidity): A contextually rigid designator

is a term that designates the same object

context

c

o

given a specied

in all possible worlds.

And it follows that,

Denition 15.

(Contextual Name Rigidity):

A proper name

contextually rigid only under the condition that if
object

o,

then

N

designates

o

N

N

is

designates

in a contextually rigid manner.

Also, we can redene the necessity of identity statements involving proper names,

Denition 16.

(Contextual Necessity): Given a specied context

F = N , then it is contextually necessary
and N are contextually rigid names.
If

that

F = N,

where

c,
F

In the next part, we will investigate the eect of the notion of
contextual rigidity on Kripke's necessary a posteriori propositions,
and contingent a priori propositions.

5.5.1 Contextually Necessary A Posteriori Propositions
Recall that Kripke argues that a proper name identity statement
like `Hesperus=Phosphorus' is necessary a posteriori. Nonetheless,
by implementing the contextualist line of thought explained above,
we can argue that such statement is indeed a posteriori, but not
necessary. To do this we need to argue against the rigidity of the
proper names `Hesperus' and `Phosphorus.' Imagine the following
story: world
is true.

w1

is the actual world where `Hesperus=Phosphorus'

Now consider a counterfactual world

rus=Phosphorus' is true at all time before

t1 .

w2

where `Hespe-

But it just happened

that from t1 , there was a political decree to limit the use of the name
`Hesperus' to the `son of Eos'; and hence the statement `Hesperus=
Phosphorus' after

t1

becomes clearly false. So for `Hesperus' to be-

come a rigid designator in worlds
a context in

w2

w1

and

w2 ,

we need to specify

that veries our original statement. The modied

statement will be something like `Hesperus=Phosphorus at all

w1 ,

and before

t1

in

w2 ,'

t

in

which is contextually necessary a posteri-

ori. This contextualist method can be used systematically to create
counterfactual worlds that violate the non-restricted necessity of
proper name identities.
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5.5.2 Contextually Necessary A Priori Propositions
The natural extension of the previous train of thought is to ask: Is
a priori knowledge necessary à la Kripke? In other words, can we
argue for the necessity of a priori knowledge based on the Kripkean
notion of rigid designators? We will claim a negative answer to this
question. More specically, we will propose that a priori knowledge
is contextually necessary but not necessary. First let us consider the
following scenario regarding a priori standard arithmetic:



In world

w1 the domain of integers is dened for all t, and hence

the equation ` x +5=2' has a necessary solution of `-3'.



In world

w2 , before time t1 , the only dened arithmetic domain

is the set of natural numbers, and hence the equation ` x +5=2'
has no solution.

After

t1 ,

negative integers were introduced

in the arithmetic system, and hence `-3' becomes a necessary
solution to `x +5=2'
Thus, the statement `-3 +5=2' is not necessary, but the statement
`-3+5=2 after

t1 '

is contextually necessary. Similarly, we can argue

for the contextual necessity of a priori knowledge using Aristotelian
logic. One of the famous syllogisms in Aristotelian logic that was
considered by medievals to be valid is the Darapti :

 P1 .

All As are Cs.

 P2 .

All As are Bs.

 C.

Some Cs are Bs.

Nevertheless, the Darapti syllogism is invalid in rst-order logic
mainly due to the absence of the existential import in rst-order
logic58 . Now consider the following scenario:



In world

w1 , the only used logical
t. Hence the Darapti is

logic for all



In world

w2 ,

t1 is the Arist1 , rst-order logic replaced Aris-

totelian logic as the used system.
58 For

t.

the only used logical system before

totelian logic. However, after
valid before

system is the Aristotelian
valid for all

t1 ,

but invalid after

Therefore, the Darapti is

t1 .

a discussion about this, see Priest (2006), section 10.8.
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Here also the a priori statement `The Darapti syllogism is valid' is
not necessary as the Darapti is not a rigid designator. To see this,

w1 , but an
So in a sense the `Darapti' is not a rigid

note that the name `Darapti' picks a valid syllogism in
invalid one in

w2

after

t1 .

designator as it does not pick out the same object in the two worlds

t.

for all

Still, the restricted statement `The Darapti syllogism is

t in w1 , and before t1 in w2 ' is contextually necessary as
the Darapti is a contextual rigid designator .
valid at all

6

Conventionalism, Apriority and Necessity

6.1

Revising the A Priori

In his Critique of Pure Reason , Kant often refers to three great a
priori sciences: geometry, arithmetic, and logic. For him the objective reference of our sensuous experience is constituted by certain
cognitive a priori forms  of intuition and thought  which order the
matter of intuition and thus constitute its relation to objective correlates. These formal structures of experience (viz. the pure intuitions
of space and time and the categories) are exemplied in and function
as conditions of the possibility of the three aforementioned sciences.
Space, in this sense, corresponds to geometry, time corresponds to
arithmetic, and the categories correspond to logic. For Kant, geometry and arithmetic 59 are synthetic a priori systems of propositions 60 ,
whereas formal logic  in contradistinction to transcendental logic 
is a body of analytic propositions, which, as such, are a priori true 61 .
This gives us the elds of Euclidean geometry, standard arithmetic,
and Aristotelian logic 62 . Traditionally, and even intuitively, a priori
knowledge was taken to be non-revisable knowledge, mainly due to
its association with analyticity and necessity.
In the previous section, we argued that a priori knowledge might
not be necessary in the Kripkean sense; rather, it is contextually
necessary. Contextual necessity aims to restrict Kripkean necessity
to limited contexts; and therefore it might be the case that some
statements are necessary in some contexts, but not necessary in
others.
59 The

In what follows, we are going to investigate whether the

dominant twentieth century view, mainly due to Frege, is that arithmetic is analytic

a priori, and not synthetic a priori as claimed by Kant (c.f. Hinckfuss (1996)).

CPR

60 B15-16,
.
61 B190 and B193,
62 See Priest (2004).

CPR

.
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context of utterance plays a role in shaping our ideas about necessity
by looking at the most prestigious a priori science, namely logic.
In an attempt to resolve the dilemma of the revisability of logic,
Graham Priest (2014) distinguishes between three senses of the word
`logic:'



Logica docens



Logica utens



Logica ens

First, logica docens is logic as claimed by logicians (i.e. what logicians teach about logic in their textbooks). Second, logica utens is
logic as practiced, for reasoning, by people.

Finally, logica ens is

logic in-itself (i.e. what is the real notion of validity, and so on).
Priest argues that it is not only possible for logica docens to be
revised, but it was de facto revised.
At any rate, one needs only a passing acquaintance with
logic texts in the history of Western logic to see that the

logica docens was quite dierent in the various periods.
The dierences between the contents of Aristotle's Analyt-

ics , Paul of Venice's Logica Magna , the Port Royale Logic ,
or the Art of Thinking , Kant's Jäsche Logik , and Hilbert
and Ackermann's Principle's of Mathematical Logic would
strike even the most casual observer. It is sometimes suggested that, periods of oblivion aside, the development of
logic was cumulative. That is: something once accepted,
was never rejected. Like the corresponding view in science,
this is just plain false. (213)
Here, Priest is stressing that the process of revising logica docens
was not a mere extension of logical systems over a continuum. For
example, as seen before, the Darapti  which is a valid Aristotelian
syllogism  cannot be validated within rst-order logic. Moreover,
it cannot be validated within rst-order logic without invalidating
other principals of Aristotelian logic. He writes,
But it might well be suggested that the adoption of classical logic did not revise Aristotelian logic in any interesting
sense: Aristotelian logic was perfectly correct as far as it
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went; it was just incomplete.

Classical logic simply ex-

tended it to a more complete theory.

Such a suggestion

would be false. It is a well-known fact, often ignored by
philosophers (though not, perhaps, historians of philosophy) that Aristotelian logic is incompatible with classical
logic in just the same way that non-Euclidean geometries
are incompatible with Euclidean geometry. (2006, 164 165)
Therefore, our logica docens is revisable to a great extent. It is notable that Priest's argument is not novel by any mean as W.V. Quine
argued in his seminal paper Two Dogmas of Empiricism 63 that it
is very hard to draw the dividing line between revisable and nonrevisable theories; and hence all a priori sciences are just as revisable
as a posteriori ones. A decade later, Hilary Putnam (1962) argued
for the revisability of logic too. In 1969, Putnam suggests that classical logic (viz. First-order logic) can be replaced by quantum logic
when reasoning about the micro-scale world. Putnam even takes his
argument further by claiming the possibility of revising the law of
non-contradiction based on empirical ndings.
But we should be clear about what the centrality argument64 does not show. It does not show that a putative
law of logic, for instance the Principle of Contradiction,
could not be overthrown by direct observation. Presumably I would give up the Principle of Contradiction if I
ever had a sense datum which was both red and not red,
for example. And the centrality argument sheds no light
on how we know that this could never happen. (1983, 110)
The more dicult question is whether logic qua Logica ens can be
revised.

Priest thinks that this question is reducible to another

simpler question, namely: what is validity ? If the notion of validity
changes, Logica ens can change.
Whether the truth of validity-claims can change will depend on what, exactly, constitutes validity. Let me illustrate. Suppose that one held a divine command theory
63 (1951, 20-43).
64 The centrality

argument, for Putnam, is that the laws of logic are presupposed by so

much of the activity of argument itself that it is no wonder that we cannot envisage their
being overthrown, or all of them being overthrown, by rational argument (1983, 110).
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of validity: something is valid just if God says so. Then
God being constant and immutable, what is valid could
not change.

On the other hand, suppose that one were

to subscribe to the dentist endorsement view of validity:
what is valid is what 90% of dentists endorse.

Clearly,

that can change (11)
He then argues that l ogica ens cannot be revised given the available
notions of validity: the model-theoretic and proof-theoretic notions.
A full discussion of this point, however, does not fall within the
scope of this essay.
6.2

On Conventionalism: Wittgenstein

The story of conventionalism can be traced back to Henri Poincaré
who was working within a Kantian framework, however, he was still
not completely satised with it. The source of his dissatisfaction is
that the theorems of geometry did not t in any Kantian typology of
knowledge. For example, the state of Euclidean space is not analytic
a priori, nor synthetic a priori, nor a posteriori. It is not a priori
since it is conceivable to imagine a non-Euclidean space with no
contradictions 65 ; hence it is not a necessary truth. In addition, it is
not a posteriori too since it is not possible for the empirical world to
falsify that `space is Euclidean.' Put dierently, there are many consistent `geometries' that are incompatible with each other, but still
cannot be proved or disproved using experience, so it is not an empirical truth either. Poincaré solves this geometric-typological problem
by introducing the new epistemic class of conventional knowledge .
Hence a statement like `space is Euclidean' becomes just conventional knowledge that does not express a necessary truth, nor an
empirical truth. He writes,
Are they [the axioms] synthetic a priori intuitions, as Kant
armed? They would then be imposed upon us with such
a force that we could not conceive of the contrary proposition, nor could we build upon it a theoretical edice.
There would be no non-Euclidean geometry. ([1902] 1952,
48)
65 Recall

that if a proposition is a priori then it is necessary, according to Kant.
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With the rise of logical positivism, the conventionalist program was
to reduce all necessary truth(s) to linguistic conventions. A major
contribution of Wittgenstein in the debate on the nature of necessity is to emphasize the role of language-games in perceiving internal
relations among objects.

Alberto Coa (1991) compares the shift

made toward the constitutive role of language by Wittgenstein to
the shift toward the constitutive role of reason made by Kant66 .
The later Wittgenstein shared with the logical positivists their dissatisfaction with the available philosophical treatments of necessary
truth, but he diverged from them on many other points 67 . Generally speaking, conventionalists  along with Wittgenstein  reject
the positions of Platonism, empiricism and psychologism regarding
the nature of necessary truth.

Wittgenstein expresses this in his

Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (RFM).
It is as if this expressed the essence of form.I say, however: if you talk about essence, you are merely noting
a convention.

But here one would like to retort:

there

is no greater dierence than that between a proposition
about the depth of the essence and one about a mere
convention.

But what if I reply:

to the depth that we

see in the essence there corresponds the deep need for the
convention. (I:74, [1956] 1967)
But how can we, then, link the notion of the `conventional' to the
notion of the `necessary' ? After all, it seems that the conventional
is contingent while the necessary is non-contingent. There are two
general responses by conventionalists to this question. Firstly, the
(assumed) necessary truths and conventional rules share a norma-

tive feature.

So, the rejection of their violations is due to their

normativity. Wittgenstein writes: If 2 and 2 apples add up to only
3 apples, i.e. if there are 3 apples there after I have put down two
66 Coa

writes:

Wittgenstein's and Carnap's insights on the a priori belong in the same family as
Kant's. One could, in fact, mimic Kant's famous "Copernican" pronouncement
to state their point: If our a priori knowledge must conform to the constitution
of meanings, I do not see how we could know anything of them a priori; but if
meanings must conform to the a priori, I have no diculty in conceiving such a
possibility. (263)

67 For

an elaborate account of the history of conventionalism from Poincaré to Quine, see

Ben-Menahem (2006).
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and again two, I don't say: `So after all 2 +2 are not always 4; but
Somehow one must have gone 68 '.  Secondly, and more importantly,
conventional rules and necessary truths are both constitutive . For
the conventionalist, the common sense understanding that necessary
truths are descriptive (i.e. describing an external reality) is awed.
Instead, these laws of thought constitute our mode of reasoning, call
this the priority argument :
The steps which are not brought in question are logical
inferences.

But the reason why they are not brought

in question is not that they `certainly correspond to the
truth'or something of the sort,no, it is just this that is
called `thinking,' `speaking,' `inferring,' `arguing.' There
is not any question at all here of some correspondence between what is said and reality; rather is logic antecedent
to any such correspondence; in the same sense, that is, as
that in which the establishment of a method of measurement is antecedent to the correctness or incorrectness of a
statement of length. ( RFM , I:155)
But if the laws of thought are conventional, then we face the famous
problem of arbitrariness . In other words, if the so-called necessary
laws are being postulated by convention, then they could have been
otherwise, which is counterintuitive. Alan Sidelle (2009) articulates
this objection as follows:
One of the more familiar arguments against modal Conventionalism goes something like this: According to Conventionalism, what is necessary, or essential, is so because
of our conventions, our ways of conceiving and/or talking
about the world. But our conventions, whatever they are,
might have been dierent. If so, the Conventionalist must
admit that what is necessary or essential might not have
been so. But, then, it is not really necessary or essential
then! So conventionalism is false. (224)
Wittgenstein was quite aware of this problem, as a possible `response' in Philosophical Grammar (1974) might show: Grammatical rules determine a meaning and are not answerable to any meaning they could contradict . . . The rules of grammar are arbitrary in
68

RFM

, I:156.
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the same sense as the choice of a unit of measurement 69 . The quote
suggests the Wittgensteinian endorsement of the arbitrariness view
of conventionalism. Ben-Menahem (2006) distinguishes between two
types of arbitrariness of conventions. In one type, arbitrariness is
interpreted as unjustiability . So in that sense, a convention is arbitrary if it cannot be justied by exogenous factors. In the other
type, a convention is arbitrary if we can change it without changing its meaning or nature.

Now we can see that the arbitrariness

of constitutive conventions regarding a priori knowledge comes only
in the rst sense. In that way, David Lewis (1969) considers that
`driving on one side of the road' is not a convention as it can be justied70 ; while `driving on which side of the road 71 ' is a convention
as it cannot be justied. Applying this to our modes of inference
expressed in logic, Wittgenstein probably thinks of it as arbitrary
à la rst type of arbitrariness but not à la second type of arbitrariness. The priority argument, mentioned above, shows that the rules
of inference used in reasoning must be there in order to equip the
notion of reason itself with a meaning, and hence these rules of inference are arbitrary in the rst sense. But if these rules of inference
change, our mode of reasoning will change too, and hence they are
not arbitrary in the second sense. For the conventionalist, labeling
`necessities' as `conventional' does not undermine their compelling
force in our thought by any mean. This form of conventionalism is
mainly a refutation of the meta -necessity of necessary statements
rather than a refutation of their necessity 72 . Ben-Menahem (2006)
comments on this point:
...

Traditional necessary truths lose nothing when seen

as constitutive conventions rather than super-truths, for
as far as our actual life and thought is concerned, what is
constitutive of our basic activities is every bit as unassailable as traditional necessary truth. (266)
Despite resolving the prima facie tension between conventionalism
and necessity, there remains a more subtle paradox in the Wittgensteinian version of conventionalism. Recall that Wittgenstein thinks
69 I: 133.
70 To reduce the number of accidents, for instance.
71 I.e. right side or left side.
72 Sidelle (2009) criticizes this form of conventionalism
statements but only rejects their meta-necessity).
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(viz. that accepts the necessity of

that the notion of necessity arises from some linguistic conventions,
and cannot be related to any deeper truth about the world. This is
obvious from his treatment of mathematics as an invention rather
than as a discovery .

He writes in Lectures on the Foundations of

Mathematics ([1939] 1976): One talks of mathematical discoveries.
I shall try again and again to show that what is called a mathematical discovery had much better be called a mathematical invention 73 .
So what is traditionally thought of as necessary is a mere reection
of our linguistic practices as opposed to a fundamental truth: The
connexion which is not supposed to be a causal, experiential one, but
much stricter and harder, so rigid even, that the one thing somehow
already is the other, is always a connexion in grammar. (I: 128)
But, paradoxically, this conventionalist view is challenged by
Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox discussed before in section 3.
The dilemma of the rule-following paradox is that every action can
be interpreted according to a given rule; no course of action could
be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made
to accord with the rule 74 . Nevertheless, and paradoxically, conventionalism was exactly supposed to answer why we follow this specic
rule and not another one, namely because of a specic convention.
But the rule-following paradox questions that by allowing the same
rule to be interpreted in dierent courses of action, and allowing the
same action to be interpreted by many rules. Wittgenstein attempts
to solve this by showing that  . . . there is a way of grasping a rule
which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we
call `obeying the rule' and `going against it' in actual cases 75 . It
is not clear here if this solution is going to work since conventionalism  although itself being unjustied  is supposed to give us a
justication of why we apply specic rules in specic ways.
Michael Dummett (1978) attempted to save the Wittgensteinian
position from inconsistency by distinguishing two types of conventionalism.

The rst type of conventionalism is that widely held

by the logical positivists which can be summarized in A.J. Ayer's
([1936] 1946) words:
73 P. 22
74 , I:
75 , I:

PI
PI

201.
201.
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Just as it is a mistake to identify a priori propositions with
empirical propositions about language, so I now think that
it is a mistake to say that they are themselves linguistic
rules. For apart from the fact that they can properly said
to be true, which linguistic rules cannot, they are distinguished also by being necessary, whereas linguistic rules
are arbitrary.

At the same time, if they are necessary,

it is only because the relevant linguistic rules are presupposed.

Thus, it is a contingent, empirical fact that the

word earlier is used in English to mean earlier, and it
is an arbitrary, though convenient, rule of language that
words that stand for temporal relations are to be used
transitively; but given this rule, the proposition that, if A
is earlier than B and B earlier than C, A is earlier than C
becomes a necessary truth. (17)
This type is what Dummett labels modied conventionalism which
distinguishes between trivial conventionalism like using the word
`earlier' to mean earlier, and non-trivial conventionalism like the
transitivity rule. Hence there is a dierence between what a specic
community adopts as convention (e.g.

modus ponens as a mode

of inference), and the consequences of this convention (e.g.
truth-value of the application of modus ponens).

the

Dummett sug-

gests that Wittgenstein rejects modied conventionalism in favor of

full-blown conventionalism . In the latter form of conventionalism,
each individual application of a rule is a new convention76 . Thus,
the formation of convention becomes an individual choice in fullblown conventionalism, while being a communal choice in modied
conventionalism 77 .
6.3

More on Conventionalism: Carnap, Quine and Lewis

Generally speaking, we can think of two ways of dening terms

within any language. The rst way is known as implicit denition 78 .
The idea is that if we can x the meaning of an expression by imposing a set of constraints on its usage in longer expressions (e.g.
76 Wittgenstein

writes: It would almost be more correct to say, not that an intuition was

needed at every stage, but that a new decision was needed at every stage (

77 The

(1965) and Diamond (1991), among others.

78 See

PI

, I: 158).

Dummettian solution received multiple criticisms from many philosophers like Stroud
Hale and Wright (2000) for an exposition on implicit denitions.

49

sentences), then these stipulated constraints will dene the truth of
those sentences based on previously understood vocabulary. Oppositely, we have the explicit denition which aims to supply a seman-

tic equivalent expression of the deniendum.

Conventions can be

regarded as a series of stipulated implicit denitions that constitute
the meaning  and truth  of the dened expressions. Consequently,
the necessity of all a priori statements is a result of our linguistic
conventions, rather than representing any metaphysical truth. By
extending these ideas to logical systems, Carnap 79 established his

linguistic doctrine of logical truth . For any formal system, Carnap's
project proceeds by stipulating a set of axioms and a set of rules
of inference, both of which are taken to implicitly dene the logical
constants of the formal system in consideration. These transformation rules (viz. the rules of inferences) which specify the legitimacy
of our inferences in a formal system are merely conventional 80 .

Denition 17.

Carnap's truth-by-convention : The logical truths of a

language system

LS

are all and only those sentences of

LS

true-in-LS solely in virtue of the linguistic conventions for

that are

LS 81 .

By changing the linguistic conventions of the language system

LS ,

the logical truth of sentences in

LS

might vary accordingly.

Carnap thinks that we can move freely between conventions, and
hence language systems. More particularly, Carnap (1937, 51) proposes a principle of tolerance which states that it is not our business
to set up prohibitions, but to arrive at conventions. This induces
an element of contingency and arbitrariness in the adopted convention as there are no general specications for any system's rules 82 .
Carnap (1937) writes:

In logic there are no morals .

Everyone is at liberty to

build up his own logic, i.e., his own form of language, as
79 See Carnap (1937, 1947, 1950,
80 The epistemic problem of how

1955).
we can be justied in accepting the truth logical of state-

ments (and rule of inferences) based on schematic explicit denitions is a hard problem. Gillian
Russell (2008) wrote about this:
I am inclined to think it is one of the biggest unsolved problems facing philosophy
today. If I were to construct a `Hilbert List' of unsolved problems in philosophy,
it would certainly make the top threebut perhaps this is just because I need
to solve it and I can't. (164, ft. 5)

81 This formulation is due to Ebbs (2011, 194).
82 For an extensive discussion of Carnap's thoughts,
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see Coa (1991).

he wishes. All that is required of him is that if he wishes
to discuss it, he must state his methods clearly, and give
syntactical rules instead of philosophical arguments. (52)
Historically, Carnap's notion of truth-by-convention lost its vigor 83
mainly due to Quine's objections 84 . The central argument against
Carnap appears in Quine's inuential article Truth by Convention :
In the adoption of the very conventions . . . whereby logic
itself is set up, however, a diculty remains to be faced.
Each of these conventions is general, announcing the truth
of every one of an innity of statements conforming to a
certain description; derivation of the truth of any specic
statement from the general convention thus requires a logical inference, and this involves us in an innite regress.
(270)
The problem of the truth-by-convention program, according to Quine,
is that if logical truth is postulated by linguistic conventions, then
we need as many conventions as the number of logical truths. Nevertheless, this seems very counterintuitive as there can be an innite
number of logical truths which require an innite number of conventions. The only maneuver available for the conventionalist is to
assume a general convention (i.e. a metatheoretic convention) from
which she can logically infer the other more specic conventions.
But the diculty, again, is that the rules of logical inferences themselves have to be based on other conventions which in turn need
other metaconventions to justify, and hence running into innite

regress .

Here, Quine uses the same intuition of Lewis Carroll for

the unjustiability of deduction to argue for the unjustiability of
truth-by-convention. He writes:
The linguistic doctrine of logical truth is sometimes expressed by saying that such truths are true by linguistic
83
Boghossian (1996) wrote:
In his classic early writings on analyticity  in particular, in "Truth by Convention," "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," and "Carnap and Logical Truth"  Quine
showed that there can be no distinction between sentences that are true purely
by virtue of their meaning and those that are not.

In so doing, Quine devas-

tated the philosophical programs that depend upon a notion of analyticity 
specically, the linguistic theory of necessary truth. (360)

84 For

instance, Quine (1936, 1951a, 1951b, 1960).
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convention.

Now if this be so, certainly the conventions

are not in general explicit . . . For it is impossible in principle, even in an ideal state, to get even the most elementary part of logic exclusively by the explicit application
of conventions stated in advance.

(The diculty is the

vicious regress, familiar from Lewis Carroll which I have
elaborated elsewhere). Briey the point is that the logical
truths, being innite in number, must be given by general
conventions rather than singly; and logic is needed then
to begin with, in the meta-theory, in order to apply the
general conventions to individual cases. (Quine 1960, 357)
One way to avoid the innite regress of conventions is by relaxing the

explicit stipulation of conventions, and adopting a dierent kind of
conventionalism  conventionalism through behavioral practice, for
instance. Likewise, Quine rejects this alternative since it is opaque
how a convention can be formerly adopted without spelling out its

explicit formulation. Also, the newly formulated language will lose
its deliberateness, and hence lose some essential characteristics we
think it should possess.
When we rst agree to understand `Cambridge' as referring to Cambridge in England failing a sux to the contrary, and then discourse accordingly, the role of linguistic convention is intelligible; but when a convention is incapable of being communicated until after its adoption,
its role is not so clear. In dropping the attributes of deliberateness and explicitness from the notion of linguistic
convention we risk depriving the latter of any explanatory
force and reducing it to an idle label. We may wonder what
one adds to the bare statement that the truths of logic and
mathematics are a priori, or to the still barer behavioristic
statement that they are rmly accepted, when he characterizes them as true by convention in such a sense. (Quine
1936, 273)
Non-explicit adoption of linguistic conventions, according to Quine,
is not well motivated then. If these conventions merely appear as
mere regularities of behavior , it will be hard to justify the tight relation between the truth of a logical sentence and its meaning. It
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will turn out that the formulated language is just a description of
a previously adopted behavior, and hence it will lose its supposed
truth. In order to respond to the Quinean objections we need, rst,
to dierentiate between formal language conventionalism (viz. conventionalism pertaining to formal languages) and natural language

conventionalism (viz.

conventionalism pertaining to natural lan-

guages). Quine's objections do not apply to the former type of conventionalism as the syntax and semantics of any formal language
are simply stipulated with the aid of natural language, and there is
no need for other prior conventions as Quine suggests. In their unpublished correspondence 85 , Carnap seems to notice this regarding
formal languages:
The dierence between analytic and synthetic is a dierence internal to two kinds of statements inside a given language structure; it has nothing to do with the transition
from one language to another.

`Analytic' means rather

much the same as true in virtue of meaning.

Since in

changing the logical structure of language everything can
be changed, even the meaning assigned to the `.' sign, naturally the same sentence (i.e., the same sequence of words
or symbols) can be analytic in one system and synthetic in
another, which replaces the rst at some time. Since the
truth of an analytic sentence depends on the meaning, and
is determined by the language rules and not the observed
facts, then an analytic sentence is indeed `unrevisable' in
another sense: it remains true and analytic as long as the
language rules are not changed. (431-432)
Let us think of a natural language (say English) whose syntax and
semantics are held xed for a period of time.

Now the question

is: can we generate multiple formal languages from the same natural language without manipulating the latter? If changing the logical structure of a formal language changes everything regarding
that language (e.g.

an analytic statement in one formal language

might be a synthetic statement in another formal language), then
it appears that we have a positive answer to our question. For instance we can start by generating classical logic, and then make
85 Quine,

W. V., and Rudolf Carnap.

spondence and related work

Dear Carnap, Dear Van: the Quine-Carnap corre-

. Richard Creath (ed.) CA: University of California Press, 1990.
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some amendments (i.e.

impose dierent stipulations) on its syn-

tax and semantics to create three-valued logic.

This can be done

using the same linguistic conventions of English without running
into innite regress.

Interestingly, our argument uses the reverse

methodology of two important programs in linguistics, namely the
program of formal syntax (Chomsky 1957) 86 and the program of formal semantics (Montague 1974) 87 . We think our argument is more
`natural' as it takes natural languages to be more primitive than the

formal language of logic 88 . Nevertheless, Quine's objections are perfectly applicable to natural language conventionalism. Fortunately,
there is a possible way out of this predicament via David Lewis'

(1969) account on conventionalism. For Lewis, the whole problem
of linguistic conventions boils down to coordination problems 89 . For
Lewis, conventions arise as non-explicit solutions to coordination
problems, and hence have no clear codication to be spelled out.
This move will avoid the Quinean objection against Carnap. Lewis
(1969) denes a convention as follows:

Denition 18.

(Convention90 ):

members of a population
situation
86 The

S

P

A regularity

R

in the behavior of

when they are agents in a recurrent

is a convention if and only if it is true that, and it is

Chomskian program is to dene the set of all well-formed sentences of a natural

language.

87 This program aims to nd an association between logical semantics and meaningful expres-

sions of natural languages. On the relation between formal languages and natural languages,
Montague (1970) writes:
There is in my opinion no important theoretical dierence between natural languages and the articial languages of logicians; indeed, I consider it possible to
comprehend the syntax and semantics of both kinds of language within a single
natural and mathematically precise theory. On this point I dier from a number
of philosophers, but agree, I believe, with Chomsky and his associates. (373)

88 The

relation between natural languages and logical systems has been investigated since

few decades. For instance, Van Benthem (1986, 1987) observed that natural languages have a
form of `natural logic', which is a system of universal forms of reasoning that operate on the
surface form of natural languages. Likewise, Lako (1970) argued for the deep correspondence
between logical rules of natural languages and the grammatical structures of natural languages:
. . . most of the reasoning that is done in the world is done in natural language.
And correspondingly, most uses of natural language involve reasoning of some
sort.

Thus it should not be too surprising to nd that the logical structure

that is necessary for natural language to be used as a tool for reasoning should
correspond in some deep way to the grammatical structure of natural language.
(151)

89 In

fact, all social interactions are dominated by coordination problems; from economic

coordinations on media of exchange, to the meanings of hand gestures.

90 78.

54

common knowledge in
members of

P

that, in almost any instance of

S

among

P,
R;

1.

almost everyone conforms to

2.

almost everyone expects everyone else to conform to

3.

almost everyone has approximately the same preferences re-

R;

garding all possible combinations of actions;
4.

almost everyone prefers that any one more conform to
condition that almost everyone conform to

5.

almost everyone would prefer that any one more conform to
′
on condition that almost everyone conform to R ,

where

P

R,

in

R′

on

R;
R′ ,

is some possible regularity in the behavior of members of

S,

such that almost no one in almost any instance of
′
members of P could conform to both R and to R.

S

among

As noticed, Lewis' conventionalism is constituted by a series of
expectations and preferences that reinforce a behavior-regularity.
Moreover, this

R

is arbitrary and contingent as it could be substi′′
tuted by any other R as long as conditions (1)-(5) are satised 91 .
Now we have a more consistent narrative that avoids the Quinean
objections.

The story goes as follows:

rstly, natural languages

evolved via implicit conventions à la Lewis. Then, formal languages
developed à la Carnap from natural languages. This implies that formal languages themselves are also conventional. To see this, Lewis
identies consequences of conventions as follows:

Denition 19.
regularity
quence of

′

A consequence

R that
R′ 92 .

R∗

R only if there is a
not-R∗ is a logical conse-

depends on

is alternative to

R,

and

But since formal languages are arbitrary, it seems that we are
stuck with the problem of how to give an account of our intuition
91 Although

there have been multiple criticisms for Lewis' conventionalism (c.f.

Binmore

(2008) and Moore (2013)), we nonetheless think that the essence of his thesis survives these
attacks.

92 80.
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of the prima facie necessity of formal languages 93 . Upon deeper reection, it turns out that this common sense objection is hard to
motivate for multiple reasons. First, note that Carnap, in the aforementioned quotation, mentions that the same symbols can acquire
dierent meanings by changing the logical structure of the object
language.

LR

Subsequently, a logical rule

for a language inherits

its meaning(s) from its relation to other logical rules, not- LR, in
the same language.

Therefore, if the meaning of not- LR changes

LR will change
LR, then, is just a

The common

then the meaning of

consequently.

sense necessity of

relational necessity , nothing

more. Second, we have an empirical evidence about the, de facto,
existence of multiple formal languages (e.g. intuitionistic logic, paraconsistent logic, three-valued logic, etc.) according to which we can
reason. Moreover, these logical systems are incompatible with each
other, implying that necessary truths are incompatible with each
This begs the question of which logical system is the true

other.

Conventionalism suggests that all of them are equally true,

one?

and saves the whole logical enterprise.
To wrap up, we argued for a narrative about how formal languages can be rooted in natural linguistic conventions in a way
that avoids Quine's original criticisms of Carnap. In addition, the
emergence of natural languages can be formulated using Lewis' nonexplicit conventionalism.

7

Contextualism

One of the recent developments in analytic philosophy is the rising
93 There

common sense
Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics

is a tradition in philosophy that undermines the role of

sophical argumentation. For instance, in his
writes:

in philo-

To appeal to ordinary common sense . . . is one of the subtle discoveries of recent
times, whereby the dullest windbag can condently take on the most profound
thinker and hold his own with him . . .

this appeal is nothing other than a call

to the judgment of the multitude; applause at which the philosopher blushes,
but at which the popular wag becomes triumphant and deant. [4: 259].
Attacks on common sense can also be found in Hegel's

Phenomenology of Spirit

,

Since the man of common sense makes his appeal to feeling, to an oracle within
his breast, he is nished and done with anyone who does not agree; he has only
to explain that he has nothing more to say to anyone who does not nd and
feel the same in himself.

In other words, he tramples underfoot the roots of

humanity. (43)
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; Kant

popularity of contextualism as an inuential player in many branches
of philosophy (e.g. philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, epistemology, metaphysics, and others). The most obvious manifestation of contextuality is in the usage of indexicals . Imagine person

A who says to person B  My opinion is right and your opinion is
mistaken, and person B responds by saying the same statement to
person A. Intuitively, we are eligible to think that the two statements are not compatible although, prima facie, they are expressed
with the same utterance. In this sense, the designation of indexicals changes from one context to another depending on the speaker,
time, place, among other determinants. David Kaplan (1989) provided a list of such indexicals like: personal nouns (e.g. she, he,
it), demonstrative pronouns (e.g.

this, that), adjectives (e.g.

present, actual), adverbs (here, later, tomorrow), and others.

In addition, contextualism can be motivated by the usage of

modal terms.

Example 1.

Suppose that both Amira and Dina utter the following

statement: Ashraf might have been a philosopher 94 . Here Amira
means that  according to her knowledge  Ashraf was possibly a
philosopher. Dina, on the contrary  who knows that Ashraf is not
a philosopher  means that it has been possible for Ashraf to be a
philosopher.
Hence, Amira's usage of the word `might' is an epistemic one,
while Dina's usage of the word `might' is a metaphysical one. Changing the context of usage generated two dierent meanings for the
word `might.'

But even if we focus only on the epistemic use of

`might,' dierent meanings can still be generated by changing the
context.

Example 2.

Imagine Jack and Jim who are both looking for Topa

on campus. After some time, they both give up on nding him, and
utter the following:



(2) Topa might be on campus.

Utterance (2) can be rephrased as:



(2a) According to Jack's knowledge, Topa is on campus.

94 Assume

here that it is the case that Ashraf is

57

not

a philosopher.



(2b) According to Jim's knowledge, Topa is not on campus.

The modal term `might' varied from the epistemic context of Jack to
the epistemic context of Jim, thus generated (2a) and (2b). Furthermore, contextualism can also be extended to the class of gradable
adjective s95 (e.g. tall, heavy, valuable, etc). Consider the following
example from Richard (2004):
Suppose, to take an example, that Mary wins a million
dollar lottery. Didi is impressed, and remarks to a friend
`Mary's rich.'

Naomi, for whom a million dollars is not

really all that much, remarks in a conversation disjoint
from Didi's, `Mary is not rich at all'. . .

It seems to most

of us that Naomi is contradicting Didi. But, especially if
each remark is part of a longer conversation . . . it is very
plausible that the truth of their claims about wealth turns
on whatever standards prevail within their conversations.
This is, in any case, part and parcel of a contextualist view
of the semantics of `rich.' But then Naomi and Didi don't
disagree, in the sense that one asserts something which is
inconsistent with what the other asserts. (218)
In the same vein, the contextualist intuition can be applied to epistemic terms like `know' which are context-sensitive. Generally speaking, Duncan Pritchard (2002) classies epistemic contextual theo-

ries (i.e. contextualist theories regrading epistemic terms) into two
forms: The rst is semantic contextualism 96 in which conversational
contexts determine epistemic contexts. The second is inferential
contextualism 97 in which inferential structures are responsible for
epistemic contexts. In semantic contextualism, the word `context'
means the attributer's conversational context. So if a person
 S knows

P

Q says

then the verb `knows' expresses dierent truth-values

according the attributer's context of utterance (viz. the context of

Q

in this case). In DeRose's (1999) words:
`Contextualism' refers to the position that the truth-conditions
knowledge-ascribing and knowledge-denying sentences (sentences of the form  S knows that

95 See Bridges
96 As found in
97 As found in

P

and  S doesn't know

(2008) for more details.
the work of David Lewis (1996), and Keith DeRose (1995).
the work of Michael Williams (1991).
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P

that

and related variants of such sentences) vary in

certain ways according to the context in which they are
uttered. (1)
By changing the context of utterance of any proposition, we are
changing the epistemic standards that must be met by subject
order to claim knowledge of

P.

S

in

DeRose (1999) continues:

What so varies is the epistemic standards that

S

must

meet (or, in the case of a denial of knowledge, fail to meet)
in order for such a statement to be true. In some contexts,
 S knows that

P  requires for its truth that S have a
P and also be in a very strong epistemic
respect to P , while in other contexts, the

true belief that
position with

very same sentence may require for its truth, in addition
to

S 's

having a true belief that

lower epistemic standards.

P,

only that

S

meet some

Thus, the contextualist will

allow that one speaker can truthfully say  S knows that

P ,

while another speaker, in a dierent context where

higher standards are in place, can truthfully say  S doesn't
know that
same

S

P ,

though both speakers are talking about the

and the same

P

at the same time. (1-2)

Based on this, a high school student can claim the truth of the
following  S knows that the electron's charge is 0.00048. On the
other hand, a physics professor can consistently claim the false-

hood of the same statement S knows that the electron's charge is
0.0004898 . This is because the epistemic standard  regarding scientic rigor  of high school students is lower than those of professional
physicists. By allowing knowledge to be context-sensitive , semantic
contextualism can solve many hardcore philosophical problems like
external-world skepticism and the possibility of free will. Concerning skepticism for example, the semantic contextualist will argue
that the problem mainly arises because the skeptic is xing a high
level of epistemic standards in all conversational contexts, and the
way out is to allow these standards to vary according to contexts.
For the semantic contextualist, the epistemic standards employed in
a philosophy class are higher than those employed in quotidian conversational contexts. Consequently, it will be a coherent position for
98 The

electron charge is

4.80320451 × 10−10

electrostatic unit (Encyclopaedia Britannica).
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a philosophy student, during classtime, to believe that he does not
know the denial(s) of the skeptical hypothesis. But once he walks
outside of class, he can form the belief  without self-contradiction
 that he knows the denial(s) of the skeptical hypothesis.
Another prominent form of contextualism is presented by Williams
(1995) and labeled by Pritchard (2002) as inferential contextualism .
This form is distinguished from semantic contextualism by three
main features.

First, it is a subject 's contextualist thesis and not

an attributer's contextualist thesis.
epistemic commitment.

Second, it has an anti-realist

Third, contexts are determined by their

inferential structures, and not by their conversational modes. Concerning the rst dierence, Williams' crucial factor in determining
if  S knows

P

(or

S

does not know

P ) is S

herself, and not a third

person attributer. Concerning the second dierence, recall that semantic contextualism allowed for some contexts to be described as
epistemically superior or inferior to other contexts. This move pre-

supposes a commitment to epistemological realism , which is an extra
theoretical burden according to Williams. He writes:
What is relevant will depend on both the content of the
claim in question and the context in which the claim is entered. If all evidence is relevant evidence, then, abstracting from such contextual details, there will be no fact of
the matter as to what sort of evidence could or should be
brought to bear on a given proposition . . . No proposition,
considered in abstraction, will have an epistemic status it
can call its own. To suppose that it must is precisely to
fall in with what I call "epistemological realism." (113)
And
The sceptic must be an epistemological realist. Only epistemological realism can validate his inference from results
obtained in his very special context of philosophical reection to the general impossibility of worldly knowledge.
(130)
By rejecting epistemological realism, Williams can reject any hierar-

chical classication of epistemic contexts which allows him to grant
epistemic self-suciency for each context independently.
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To adopt contextualism, however, is not just to hold that
the epistemic status of a given proposition is liable to shift
with situational, disciplinary and other contextually variable factors: it is to hold that, independently of all such
inuences, a proposition has no epistemic status whatsoever. (P.119)
Capitalizing on this, Williams can justify the inferential nature of
contextualism. The epistemic status of each proposition is decided
based on how schematic inferences are made within the relative context.

Therefore, for Williams, a philosophy classroom's skeptical-

context does not induce higher epistemological standards, but only
a dierent inferential structure (viz.

the standards of philosophi-

cal reection in that case). Consequently, the skeptic cannot force
her epistemic standards on daily contexts since they simply do not
represent superior standards  as there are no universal standards
 that we should adopt in all contexts.

For these three main dif-

ferences between semantic and inferential contextualism, Pritchard
argues for the superiority of the latter over the former. For our purpose, we will make use of inferential contextualism later on to argue
against a priori skepticism.

8

Revisiting A Priori Skepticism

8.1

Hinge Propositions

The `Common Sense' defense of epistemic justication has been promoted by many philosophers like Thomas Reid, G.E. Moore and
Roderick Chisholm 99 . Reid once wrote: Philosophy . . . has no
other root but the principles of Common Sense; it grows out of them,
and draws its nourishment from them. Severed from this root, its
honours wither, its sap is dried up, it dies and rots 100 . Moore in the
same vein wrote:
There is no reason why we should not, in this respect,
make our philosophical opinions agree with what we necessarily believe at other times. There is no reason why I
should not condently assert that I do really know some
99 For
100 (

a contemporary defense of the Common Sense tradition, see Lemos (2004).

Inquiry and Essays

, 7)
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external facts, although I cannot prove the assertion except by simply assuming that I do. I am, in fact, as certain of this as of anything; and as reasonably certain of it.
(Philosophical Studies , 163)
And in response to skeptical claims, Moore famously reacted:
But it seems to me a sucient refutation of such views as
these, simply to point to cases in which we do know such
things. This, after all, you know, really is a nger; there
is no doubt about it: I know it, and you all know it. And
I think we may safely challenge any philosopher to bring
forward any argument in favour either of the proposition
that we do not know it, or of the proposition that it is
not true, which does not at some point rest upon some
premises which is beyond comparison, less certain, than
the proposition which it is designed to attack ( Philosoph-

ical Studies , 228)
The Moorean common sense refutation of skepticism is then based
on `knowing' that some propositions (e.g. what I see is a nger) are
just beyond doubt, and that we are reasonably justied in believing so. Moore here seems to weigh empirical observations over any
other form of philosophical-skeptical argumentation since the latter
is less `certain' than the former.

Despite the compelling Moorean

reasoning, Wittgenstein  in his nal philosophical work On Cer-

tainty (OC)  nds it awed. Wittgenstein notes that any evidence
produced to support a specic belief must be at least as certain as
that belief. Hence, for Wittgenstein, the belief I know that I have
two hands demands more basic grounds to justify it. But how can
we nd a grounding-belief, in normal circumstances, which is more
certain than knowing that I have two hands?
. . . The certainty is subjective, but not the knowledge. So
if I say I know that I have two hands, and that is not
supposed to express just my subjective certainty, I must
be able to satisfy myself that I am right. But I can't do
that, for my having two hands is not less certain before
I have looked at them than afterwards. But I could say:
That I have two hands is an irreversible belief.

That

would express the fact that I am not ready to let anything
count as a disproof of this proposition. (OC  245)
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Consequently, the common sense argument will not work as having
two hands is as certain as any other evidence that can be produced
to support it101 . One resolution, for Wittgenstein, is made by removing these Moorean truisms from the domain of knowledge. So
if having two hands is no longer a proposition that can be known,
then it can be saved from rational doubt.

Wittgenstein gives the

analogy of a pupil who wants to interrupt his history lesson to doubt
the existence of Earth. Wittgenstein objects this by saying: This
doubt isn't one of the doubts in our game 102 . So what Wittgenstein
does, to rebut skepticism, is twisting the Moorean common sense
propositions to what he labels hinges . These hinges are contingent
claims that form the foundations of any epistemic inquiry:
[ 341] That is to say, the questions that we raise and our
doubts depend upon the fact that some propositions are
exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which
those turn.
[ 342] That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientic
investigations that certain things are indeed not doubted.
[ 343] But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just
can't investigate everything, and for that reason we are
forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door
to turn, the hinges must stay put . . .
[ 345] If I ask someone what colour do you see at the moment ? in order, that is, to learn what colour is there at
the moment, I cannot at the same time question whether
the person I ask understands English, whether he wants
to take me in, whether my own memory is not leaving me
in the lurch as to the names of colours, and so on. (OC)

Hinge propositions ,

H,

are dierent from the Moorean common

sense propositions as they are not meant to be justied from the
beginning.

Any possible epistemic investigation is contingent on

them, and hence they cannot be epistemically justied. If you need
to justify

H,

certain than
as

H

then you need to produce an evidence

H

that is more

itself. For Wittgenstein this seems self-contradictory

is the most basic belief regarding the epistemic issue in con-

sideration.
101 OC
102 OC

E

 250.
 317.
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. . . When one says that such and such a proposition can't
be proved, of course that does not mean that it can't be
derived from other propositions; any proposition can be
derived from other ones. But they may be no more certain
than it is itself. (OC  1)
Consequently, any epistemic inquiry has to presuppose certain hinge
proposition(s) before proceeding. Even philosophical skepticism has
to assume an undoubtable Archimedean point before starting the
game of doubt itself. Wittgenstein explains if you tried to doubt
everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game
of doubting itself presupposes certainty 103 . Thus, for Wittgenstein,
it will be a mistake to claim that we are justied in knowing

H;

rather we have to assume it pretheoretically .
There are multiple interpretations for the Wittgensteinian notion
of hinge propositions 104 . But due to our limited scope, we are only
going to focus on a particular view of hinge propositions that was
advanced by Michael Williams 105 . What Wittgenstein is attempting
in OC , according to Williams, is to provide a theoretical analysis
of the unrecognized presuppositions of skeptical arguments. Particularly, Williams (2005) gives a general description of these hinges:
1.

They are basic certainties, judgments, propositions which do
not constitute part of our knowledge, but also cannot be doubted.

2.

They are a kind of `framework judgments' that pave the path
for inquiring, asking, justifying, arguing, and so on.

3.

They are characterized by heterogeneity 106 . For example, these
hinges include:

simple cognitive judgments (e.g.

I have two

hands), general world-claims (e.g. the earth existed more than
ve seconds ago), elementary mathematical claims (e.g. 12*12=144),
and so on.
4.

The certainty of hinges is not due to their intrinsic credibility,
but rather due to their meaning in the language games . Hence
by doubting them we would have to suspend making judgments.

103 OC  115.
104 See for example,

Putnam (1992) and Wright (1985, 1991, 2003). Also see Pritchard (2001)

for a critique of these interpretations.

105 See Williams (2001, 2004a, 2004b, 2005).
106 This can be contrasted with the classical

foundational account of knowledge where the

class of basic beliefs is quite homogeneous.
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5.

Since these hinges are not part of our knowledge, then they are
outside of the scope of justication.

They are non-epistemic

frameworks.
Recall that Williams endorsed an inferential version of contextualism. Accordingly, in each context there must be some hinge propositions (or methodological necessities in Williams' terms) upon
which we can build our modes of inferences. In that sense, a hinge
proposition cannot be evaluated from outside its context as in that
way we will be mixing the inferential structures of dierent contexts.
The skeptic takes himself to have discovered, under the
condition of philosophical reection, that knowledge of the
world is impossible. But in fact, the most he has discovered is that knowledge of the world is impossible under
the conditions of philosophical reection. (Williams 1991,
130).
Hinge propositions can be thought of as tacit pretheoretical tools
that lack any evidential support from without the epistemic context
they are employed in. Consequently, it will be illegitimate for the
skeptic to doubt the existence of the outside world in quotidian contexts. On a daily basis, a statement like there is an outside world
is a hinge proposition for the vast majority of human activities.
Similarly, in classical logic, the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC)
can be regarded as a hinge proposition, while this is not the case in
Dialetheism 107 . In that vein, Williams oers a strong rebuttal for
skepticism by arguing that skepticism confuses the hinge propositions of skeptical contexts (e.g. philosophical contexts) with those
of non-skeptical contexts (e.g. quotidian contexts). Moreover, it is
important to note that Williams  contra Moore  is not claiming a
general rebuttal of skepticism, but rather emphasizing the contextual

nature of skeptical hypotheses. In his words,
I didn't say that I could claim to know that I am not a
brain in a vat. In fact, I didn't even say that I could claim
not to be a brain in a vat. All I said was that I do know
all sorts of mundane facts; and that for as long as I know
them, I know that various sceptical possibilities do not
obtain. Claiming is another matter. (352)
107 A

logical system where the LNC does not hold, see for example Priest and Francesco

(2013).
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Nevertheless, Pritchard (2001) points a problem in Williams' account of hinge propositions.
By focusing on the very feature of our epistemic practices that Williams highlights  that sometimes claiming
knowledge can be improper even though we have it . . . The
problem with hinge propositions is thus not that they are
sometimes unknown (in certain contexts), but that one
can never coherently claim to know them. (13)
The impossibility of claiming knowledge of hinge propositions is a
serious challenge to Williams' account of Wittgenstein 108 . It can
be compared to the problem of arbitrariness in the foundationalist
theory of epistemic justication 109 . Nevertheless, Pritchard (2011)
thinks that hinge propositions have an upper hand over traditional
foundational beliefs as the former are not arbitrary.
In short, the suggestion is that the very possibility that
one belief can count as a reason for or against another
belief presupposes that there are some beliefs which play
the role of being exempt from needing epistemic support,
and thus that it is not arbitrary that one believes hinge
propositions. (9)
Concerning our original problem of a priori skepticism, the notion
of hinge propositions might work ne with a view on the Ap-BIV
skeptical hypothesis. Alas, it seems dicult for us to conceive how
it can solve the problem of formal language skepticism in a fullyedged manner. More specically, hinge propositions can be used
against the syntactic  but not the semantic  version of the problem of deduction in a fashion similar to Putnam's centrality argument. Nevertheless, hinge propositions will fall short of solving the
rule-following paradox and the semantic version of the problem of
deduction. In the end, the roots of the latter problems are closely associated to the problem of meaning-normativity 110 . In other words,
108 Pritchard

(2001) attempts to solve this problem by developing a dierent interpretation

of Wittgenstein.

109 But

(i.e.

note rst that hinge propositions cannot be regarded as foundational epistemic beliefs

non inferential self-evident beliefs) as hinge propositions might not be self-evident or

undeniable.

110 The

thesis about the normativity of meaning is mainly due to Kripke's interpretation of

Wittgenstein:
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if we can nd a good explanation for the apparent normativity of
meaning of formal languages, we can then solve the problem of formal language skepticism 111 .
8.2

Contextual-Conventionalism

In this part we are going to compile conventionalism à la CarnapLewis112 and inferential contextualism as two complementary theses.
We start by dening our main notations: let the set of knowing
subjects113 be S : s1 , s2 , . . . , sn , and the set of known propositions

P : p1 , p2 , . . . , pm . Similarly, we can dene the set
of all possible times as T : t1 , t2 . . . , tl , and the set of all possible
worlds as W : w1 , w2 , . . . , wi . Also, the set of all possible contexts is
denoted by C = c1 , c2 , . . . , cv ; note that C denotes only the contexts
for subject

si

be

which are epistemically relevant to the knowing subject. Finally, we

Co = co1 , co2 , . . . , coy .
n-tuple K(sn , pm , wi , tl , cv , coy ) to denote that
subject sn knows proposition pm in world wi at time tl given a
specied context cv and a specied convention coy . 114 . Given our
framework, the last two parameters  cv and coy  are the most

dene the set of all possible conventions by
Now take the ordered

decisive variables in judging the epistemic status of a proposition

pm .

By changing the context

cv , the convention formed coy changes,
pm varies too. To see this,

and in accordance the epistemic status of

contrast the utterance of the following two statements:



K(s1 , p1 , w1 , t1 , c1 , co1 ).
Suppose that I do mean addition by `+'. What is the relation of this supposition
to the question of how I will respond to the problem `68 + 57' ? The dispositionalist gives a descriptive account of this relation: if `+' means addition, then
I will answer `125'. But his is not the proper account of the relation, which is
normative, not descriptive. The point is not that, if I meant addition by `+', I

will
should

answer `125', but that, if I intended to accord with my past meaning of `+',

I

answer `125'. Computation error, niteness of my capacity, and other

disposed
normative descriptive

disturbing factors may lead me not to be

to respond as I should, but if

so, I have not acted in accordance with my intention. The relation of meaning
and intention to future action is

111 Recently,

, not

. (1982, 37)

the notion of normativity of meaning became more inuential. See for example

Crispin Wright (1984), Simon Blackburn (1984), and John McDowell (1984).

112 In the sense of the position defended
113 Knowing subjects are treated in rst
114 Similar descriptions can be used for

in section 6.
person, and not through third person attributions.
other epistemic notions like `justication'. In that

n-tuple J(sn , pm , wi , tl , cv , coy ) to denote that subject sn
pm in world wi at time tl given a specied context cv and

case, take the ordered

is justied

to belief proposition

a specied

convention

coy .
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¬K(s1 , p1 , w1 , t1 , c2 , co2 ).

w1 , t1 , c1 and co1 , subject s1 knows p1 . While given w1 , t1
, c2 and co2 , the same subject s1 does not know the same proposition p1 . In our aforesaid defense of the conventionalist view of

Given

logical systems, we essentially argued that any constructed formal
language is grounded in conventional natural language 115 . We also
argued that since formal languages follow from conventional natural
language(s), formal languages are conventional too. If this defense
holds, we hopefully have a rebuttal of the problem of formal language skepticism.
8.3

Revisiting The Problem of Formal Language Skepticism

Notably in his 1950 seminal article Empiricism, Semantics, and On-

tology, Carnap distinguished between two classes of ontological questions:
...

it is above all necessary to recognize a fundamen-

tal distinction between two kinds of questions concerning
the existence or reality of entities . . .

rst, questions of

the existence of certain entities of the new kind within

the framework ; we call them internal questions ; and second, questions concerning the existence or reality of the

system of entities as a whole , called external questions .
Internal questions and possible answers to them are formulated with the help of the new forms of expressions.
The answers may be found either by purely logical methods or by empirical methods, depending upon whether the
framework is a logical or a factual one. (21-22)
Given a specic framework (e.g.

a framework of propositions, a

framework of real numbers, etc.), there are two types of  commonly confused  questions: internal and external questions. Internal questions are those questions asked concerning the ontological
status of some entities within a framework. For instance, a number
theorist can ask: are there innite twin prime numbers? The answer
to this question is analytically determined by the framework's rules.
115 An

interesting question here would be: how do dierent natural languages relate to dif-

ferent formal systems in the history of logic?
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Similarly, a physicist can ask a question about the existence of the
Higgs-Boson particle. In that case, the truth-value of the claim will
be settled by the rules of the adopted framework  which is the
standard-model in this case  with the assistance of some empirical
conrmation.

Dierently, external questions are those asked con-

cerning the ontological status of a framework as a whole . For example, a philosopher of mathematics can ask whether numbers exist
at all; or an epistemologist can ask about the existence of physical objects.

For Carnap, external questions cannot be answered.

They are pseudo-questions that lack any cognitive content. Carnap
thinks that all sorts of ontological debates arise by confusing these
two questions. While it is legitimate to make internal claims since
they can be assigned a truth-value from within the framework, it
is illegitimate to make external claims as they cannot be assigned
a truth-value at all. Then Carnap argues that the choice between
frameworks can only be made based on practical considerations.
The acceptance [of a new framework] cannot be judged as
being either true or false because it is not an assertion.
It can only be judged as being more or less expedient,
fruitful, conducive to the aim for which the language is intended. Judgments of this kind supply the motivation for
the decision of accepting or rejecting the kind of entities.
(31-32)
He also writes: Shall we introduce such and such forms into our
language? In this case it is not a theoretical but a practical question, a matter of decision rather than assertion 116 . Analogously,
contextual-conventionalism can be divided into two general categories: internal and external conventions. Internal conventions are
those existing conventions formed  whether syntactic or semantic  about a specic set of rules within a specic context 117 . For
instance, a group of number theorists can form an epistemic convention about the plausibility of a set of axioms for natural numbers
(e.g. Peano's axioms). So the convention is formed from within the
context of number theory. On the other hand, external conventions
are those conventions about the totality of a set of rules from with-

out a specic context. An example can be the convention between
116 P. 29
117 These

conventions are meant to be epistemological ones in our domain of discourse.
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some mathematicians to accept the system of natural numbers as a
system of representation. In that case, they are forming a convention about the whole context of natural numbers (viz. an external
convention), and not about a specic element within the context of
natural numbers (viz. an internal convention). Now let us go back
our original problem of a priori skepticism.
Recall that the problem of deduction is twofold: (i) the premisecircularly problem, and (ii) the rule-circularity problem. In (i), we
have an innite regress of premises where each additional rule of inference is dened as a new premise, and hence a conclusion is never
reached118 . In (ii), Susan Haack proposed two possible denitions
for deduction: semantic and syntactic denitions. Nonetheless, she
argued that there is no coherent defense for either of these denitions.

Also concerning the rule-following paradox, Kripke argued

that when using `

+'

to mean `plus' we cannot cite any fact about

our past or current usage of the term `plus' that guarantees that we
mean `

+ ',

and not `Θ.' We called this twofold dilemma the prob-

lem of formal language skepticism as it casts our concern over the
epistemic validity of the whole deductive enterprise. All being well,
contextual-conventionalism might oer a route out of our epistemic
angst. Interestingly enough, the core insight of the conventionalist
solution was mentioned at the beginning of the conversation between
Achilles and the tortoise,
-So you've got to the end of our race-course? said the
Tortoise. Even though it does consist of an innite series
of distances? I thought some wiseacre or other had proved
that the thing couldn't be done?
-It can be done, said Achilles. It has been done! Solvitur ambulando.

You see the distances were constantly

diminishing; and so (278)
Here, Achilles seems to stumble upon an easy rebuttal of the tortoise's theoretical reasoning: Solvitur ambulando (i.e. the problem
of nishing the race is solved by walking .). If both Achilles and the
tortoise agree that the former succeeded in ending the race-course,
then Achilles surpassed the challenge. Nevertheless, if the tortoise
118 This

is since Whatever Logic is good enough to tell me is worth writing down (280), as

stated by the tortoise to Achilles.
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has a good reason to be convinced that Achilles did not nish the
race, then Achilles' solvitur-ambulando-strategy will not work. To
see this, we have to think of the conversation from a contextualconventionalistic perspective.

Given the conversational context of

Achilles and the tortoise, the disagreement stems from the absence
of any convention between Achilles and the tortoise on what exactly
it means to nish the race. On one hand, the tortoise is seeking
a theory-based solution, while Achilles accepts an action-based solution. We call this: a situation of absence of external convention . It
is not dicult to draw a close analogy between the innite-series race
paradox discussed above and the problem of formal language skepticism. In the premise circularity case, the tortoise insists that every
rule of reasoning should be stated explicitly as a premise in the argument which results in an innite regress of premises. Achilles was
very suspicious about this move, and even considered that: such
obtuseness would certainly be phenomenal 119 . Hence, the regress
problem can be attributed to some absence of external convention
between Achilles and the tortoise about which language they should
use to communicate. Achilles is appealing to an intuitive  practicalbased  conception of logical entailment, while the tortoise is appealing to a philosophical conception of logical entailment. Accordingly
they do not only speak dierent languages, but they also have an implicit disagreement about which language they should use in conversing. A similar argument can be presented in Kripke's rule-following
paradox. The core problem was that any normative action can be a
subject of multiple, other, normative interpretations. In that way,
there was a disagreement between the teacher and his pupil about:
what guarantees that the student means `addition,' and not `quaddition,' by the `+' operation? Yet again, the quarrel can never settle
down because of the absence of any external convention about the
meaning of `addition.'

The paradox will only be solved when the

pupil and the master agree on whether `addition' means `

+ ,' or `Θ'

 or any other notion.
In this sense, formal language skepticism is a genuine prior disagreement about the choice of a conventional language in a specied context. This is very dierent from a more subtle disagreement
about which rules or axioms we should adopt within any specic
119 See

p. 27
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framework. An illustrative example will be the question of epistemic
justication. Here we also have an external disagreement about the
source(s) of our epistemic justication.

A skeptic who discredits

the idea of epistemic justication will never be able to communicate
with a non-skeptic who accepts such epistemic justication. In that
case, there is no common ground to stand on. Dierently, there is
an internal disagreement among the non-skeptics of epistemic justication as they accept the notion of epistemic justication but dier
about the best conceivable method of it (viz. foundationalism, coherentism, innitism).
In short, the way to remove formal language skepticism is by
removing the absence of external convention(s). Whether this is a

feasible goal or not is a dierent question that we are not going to
tackle here.
8.4

Revisiting Ap-BIV

Now we turn to the second part of a priori skepticism, namely the
Ap-BIV problem. Recall that the skeptical hypothesis was: let AP
′
be any a priori proposition, and let the skeptical hypothesis Sh be:
`I am Ap-BIV.'



P1 .



P2 .

I am unable to know the denials of

Sh′ .

If I am unable to know the denials of

Sh′ ,

then I do not

know that Ap is true.



C.

Hence, I do not know that Ap is true.

We will counterargue the aforementioned skeptical hypothesis based
on contextual-conventionalism as follows:
Claim 1.



P1∗ .

(Conventional argument ) Given AP and

Sh′

If I am unable to know the denials of

Sh′ ,

know that AP is true.



P2∗ .

I know that AP is true.



C ∗.

Therefore, I know the denials of
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Sh′ .

, then:
then I do not

P1∗

shall be accepted by the skeptic since it is identical to

P2

in

the original skeptical argument. To save the conventional argu∗
ment, we need to defend P2 . Our defense is based on contextualconventionalism. If a priori knowledge is formed by virtue of con∗
vention in a specic context as we argued before, then P2 holds trivially. After all, the convention about what denes a priori knowledge  in this context  is established by a sole subject, namely
∗
myself . Hence, C holds trivially as a private convention. Interest∗
ingly, our defense of P2 overcomes Pritchard's critique of Williams'
interpretation of Wittgenstein's hinge propositions. This is because
the conventional argument  if correct  establishes my knowledge
that AP is true.

Unfortunately, the conventional argument does

not overcome the problem of arbitrariness of Wittgenstein's hinge
propositions as it allows for  almost  anything to be a priori for
the convention-holder (viz. me). Moreover, other problems start to
arise if we propose a third-person formulation of the conventional
argument.
(Generalized conventional argument ) Let AP be any a priori
′
proposition, let S be any subject dieren t from myself, and let Sh
be a skeptical hypothesis of the form: I (subject S ) am Ap-BIV
Claim 2.



P̂1 .

If

S

Sh′ ,

is unable to know the denials of

then she does not

know that AP is true.



P̂2 . S



Ĉ .

knows that AP is true.

Therefore,

S

knows the denials of

Sh′ .

How can I (or any other subject) know that
have no access to subject

S 's private

P̂2

is true? After all, I

conventions about AP . This is

a very similar position to the problem of private experience discussed
by Wittgenstein:
The essential thing about private experience is really not
that each person possesses his own exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other people also have this or something else. The assumption would thus be possiblethough
unveriablethat one section of mankind had one sensation of red and another section another. ( PI ,  272)
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One possible way to know about

S 's

private conventions about AP

is through linguistic communication.

S

can just convey her pri-

vate conventions to me (or any other subject), and if there is an
agreement about these conventions, then we know that AP is true.
Nevertheless, if it happens that there is a disagreement about these
conventions, then

P̂2

will not hold and the generalized conventional

argument will fail. In that case, the Ap-BIV dilemma persists because of the absence of external convention(s) among subjects about
what constitutes a priori knowledge.
In the end, our contextual-conventional strategy to counter skepticism will only succeed if the skeptical subjects managed to form a
convention  within a specic context  about what denes a priori
knowledge.

Alas, this sucient condition is dicult to satisfy as

philosophers have implicitly agreed to disagree. After all, disagreement is a central dening feature of the history of philosophy and is
not expected to disappear anytime soon. This persistence of philosophical disagreement is better described in the words of Peter van
Inwagen:
Disagreement in philosophy is pervasive and irresoluble.
There is almost no thesis in philosophy about which philosophers agree. If there is any philosophical thesis that all or
most philosophers arm, it is a negative thesis: that formalism is not the right philosophy of mathematics, for
example, or that knowledge is not (simply) justied, true
belief. (2004, 332)
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